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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 The European Commission’s strategy of using Article 29 of the Schengen
Borders Code (SBC) to reduce internal border controls and gradually return to
a Schengen area free of internal borders has not prevented controls from
continuing. Each time the Council has “re-triggered” Article 29(2) SBC all five Member
States have followed the “recommendation” and maintained their internal border
controls adducing that the “persistence” of “an important number of irregular migrants
still [remaining] in Greece” continues to seriously threaten public policy and internal
security and continues to put at risk the overall functioning of the Schengen area.
 The reasons that EU Member States use to justify the reintroduction or
prolongation of temporary internal border controls still reflect crisis-mode
policy-making on migration, asylum and borders. The legal difficulty of justifying
the reintroduction internal border controls under Article 25 SBC on the basis of the
“migratory crisis” has not dissuaded Schengen States from invoking the persistence of
a “serious threat to public policy and internal security” when notifying the prolongation
of internal border controls. Some of the notifications have explicitly linked the
(secondary) movements of irregular migrants to terrorism. In some cases, (e.g.
France), it is questionable whether sufficiently distinct factual circumstances
actually justified a new period of temporary internal border controls under
Article 25 SBC.
 The European Commission has explicitly stated that the “migratory crisis and
secondary movement” can no longer be invoked to justify or prolong internal
border controls. No publicly available information is available on whether the
Commission has, to date, examined the compatibility of the most recent Schengen
States’ notifications with the Schengen Borders Code. However, recent exchanges
between the “affected” Schengen States (e.g. Germany) and the Commission suggest
that the latter is actively attempting at limiting the spaces and intensity of internal
border controls which have been reintroduced (prolonged) by some Schengen States
on the basis of Article 25 SCB.
 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) recently established a set
of benchmarks on the basis of which the lawfulness of the national legal
framework police checks can be assessed. National law on police checks must be
sufficiently clear and precise, provide limitations to the intensity and frequency of the
checks and limit the discretion of police authorities. Also, as expressly stipulated in
Article 2.10 of the SBC, the objectives of police checks must be different from ‘border
controls’. Furthermore, the CJEU established that the national frameworks on police
checks are subject to incremental legal certainty requirements. These requirements are
in fact stricter whereas is evidence that police checks conducted by Member States
authorities have equivalent effect to border checks.
 The proportionality test of national police checks is in hands of the Commission
and has been ‘Europeanised’ within the Schengen governance framework.
However, to date the collection of precise statistics is needed to verify the extent to
which current police checks in Member States are necessary, proportionate and
justified, and implemented in line with the standards provided by the CJEU.
 The EU has recently witnessed a ‘domino effect’ in the construction of external
and internal border walls and fences which different Member States built with
the aim of diverting or preventing asylum applicants from reaching and
transiting through the EU. These practices are not envisaged under the Schengen
governance mechanism and serious doubts exist as to their compatibility with the SBC
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(Article 14) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular the right to asylum
(Article 18).
 The construction of border fences challenges the very premises of the
Schengen Agreement, namely the ‘spirit of Schengen’ which relies on mutual
trust and loyal and sincere cooperation. Resorting to such national measures in
light of the so-called refugee crisis has in practice meant passing the responsibility for
asylum seekers to other Schengen States, pre-accession states and third countries
which are already hosting large numbers of international protection seekers.
 It is unclear to what extent the Commission’s proposal for extending the time
periods of internal border controls is necessary and provides an added value.
Furthermore, though the additional safeguards proposed by the Commission are a step
in the right direction, it is highly problematic that the reintroduction of internal
border controls would be based on an assessment of “perceived risk” (instead
of rigorous and sound evidence of the actual existence of a serious threat). The
proposed “risk assessment” is also problematic, as it is entirely placed in the hands of
the state that is reintroducing border controls.
 Decision to introduce or reintroduce internal border checks relies too heavily
on Member States’ Risk Assessment. On the other hand, the scope for a
formalised operability of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism is still limited in
this context. The systematic operationalisation of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism
would allow for the decision to introduce or reintroduce internal border checks to be
taken upon on robust and solid evidence of the actual existence of any threat or
challenge.
 The European Integrate Border Management (EIBM) system does not seem to
replace the old intergovernmental and non-integrated model of border control
and surveillance. However, the fact that the EIBM concept is now enshrined in the EU
Treaties means that the ways in which the European Border and Coast Guard will
implement the various EIBM components must take due regards to the EU borders and
asylum acquis, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
 Different accountability regimes and related oversight systems apply to the
border and coast guards that, on a case by case basis, participate in an
operational activity developed under the EIBM framework. The different types of
complaint procedures and remedies that are available to individuals affected by border
control, border surveillance or return activities varies depending on the specific
authority to which the agent that adopted the action or decision leading to an abuse is
affiliated to, and on the type of mission and/or framework of cooperation within which
the action or decision leading to a fundamental right infringement was adopted.
 Accountability issues further arise from third-country authorities’ participation
in the EIBM framework. The exact role and actual responsibilities of foreign
authorities acting de facto as EIBM agents remain to a large extent unclear. By
granting third-country authorities an increased operational role, the Union and the
Member States are attempting to escape the legal responsibility that would apply for
abuses committed against asylum seekers and immigrants falling under their
jurisdiction.
 The increasing interconnections and ‘interoperability’ of existing EU large
scale-data bases results in a “blurring of boundaries” between different EU
policies ranging from immigration to criminal justice and police cooperation, from
foreign and security policy to defence. However, the law enforcement and security
authorities’ use of the information contained in databases which were
primarily designed as instruments for border management and migration
control poses significant challenges to fundamental rights enshrined in the EU
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Charter, and in particular to the right to privacy, data protection and non-
discrimination.
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1. INTRODUCTION
What is the state of play of the Schengen system? And is it crisis-proof? This paper
constitutes a follow-up to a previous Study titled “Internal border controls in the
Schengen area: Is Schengen crisis-proof?”1 which was completed in June 2016, at a time
when Article 29 of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) had just been activated by the Council2
and the European Commission’s “Back to Schengen” Roadmap was still in its initial phases
(see Annex 1 for an updated overview of the developments covered in the initial Study).
The Commission’s Roadmap foresaw “bringing to an end the exceptional safeguard measures”
by the end of December 20163 and Article 29 was one of the main innovations of the SBC. It
was included as a ‘nuclear’ procedure allowing for the prolongation of internal border controls
up to two years. Such prolongation is allowed when the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism
(SEM) shows that “serious deficiencies” exist at the Schengen area’s external borders. This
update investigates why internal border controls have been introduced by several EU Member
States outside of the procedure established by Article 29 SBC and why prolongations have
exceeded all the limits foreseen by the SBC. This paper scrutinises the extent to which
innovations introduced by the ‘Back to Schengen’ Roadmap have effectively addressed
Member States’ ‘fears of secondary movements’ by asylum seekers. It questions whether
these ‘fears’ could have been better dealt under the current Schengen governance framework
and Common European Asylum System (CEAS).
The 2016 Study analysed key policy developments that followed  the Schengen
Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism’s (SEM) unannounced missions to the Greek
islands in 2015 (i.e. at the peak of the EU refugee crisis).4 At the time, Greece could
not refuse to admit asylum seekers without placing itself in breach of the 1951 UN Geneva
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the EU Treaties and the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights as well as EU secondary legislation composing the CEAS. The study found that, as a
follow-up to the visit to the Greek islands, several Schengen States became concerned with
the security challenges that were associated with the Greek authorities’ difficulties in
implementing external border controls. This, however, went to the detriment of investing in
the improvement of Greece’s reception conditions and the enhancement of the Greek
authorities’ capacity to process asylum claims.
The Study found that the EU and its Member States reacted to refugee arrivals not via the
CEAS, but through the reintroduction of internal borders, a move designed to regulate
movements of third-country nationals seeking international protection. This regardless of the
provision contained in Article 14.1 of the SBC, which stipulates that ‘normal borders
procedure’ is not applicable to asylum seekers (emphasis added):
A third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions … shall be refused entry to
the territories of the Member States. This shall be without prejudice to the application of special
provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international protection or the issue of long-
stay visas.5
Although these people were within the Schengen area, they were not allowed to move on
rapidly to seek asylum in Member States with properly-functioning asylum systems. Instead,
an extraordinary series of ad hoc responses (e.g. the closure of the so-called Balkan Route)
came into place. This led the Schengen border-free space to become a victim of a non-
functioning Common European Asylum System and in particular of the EU Dublin regime,
1 Guild et al. (2016) Study for the European Parliament, PE 571.356“Internal border controls in the Schengen area:
Is Schengen crisis-proof?”, Brussels.
2 Council (2016), Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation for temporary internal border control
in an exceptional circumstances, 8835/16, 12 May 2016.
3 European Commission (2016), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European
Council and the Council, Back to Schengen - A roadmap, COM(2016) 120 final, Brussels, 4.3.2016.
4 Guild et al. (2016) Study for the European Parliament, PE 571.356 “Internal border controls in the Schengen area:
Is Schengen crisis-proof?”, Brussels.
5 The issue is further clarified in Annex VI of the SCBC, where international protection is reiterated as a first principle
to be respected for both shared border crossings between EU Member States and between EU Member States and
third countries. This Annex emphasizes that: “…a third-country national who has passed exit control by third-country
border guards and subsequently asks Member State border guards present in the third country for international
protection, shall be given access to relevant Member State procedures in accordance with Union asylum acquis ...”
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which currently applies an unfair and non-solidarity-based model of distributing responsibility
for assessing asylum applications among EU Member States.
A majority of the EU Member States currently conducting internal border checks
within the Schengen area have officially justified such measures on the basis of “fears of
secondary movements” of asylum seekers. These asylum seekers have been often and
wrongly re-labelled as ‘irregular immigrants’. As a consequence, their right to seek asylum
under the EU asylum acquis standards has often been undermined. As the European
Commission highlighted in its assessments of Greece,
[T]he identification and registration procedure and appropriate reception conditions are
indispensable, given the subsequent secondary movements to other Member States which put
the functioning of the whole Schengen area at risk and which has led several Members States to
temporarily reintroduce border controls at their internal borders.6
Since the unfolding of the so-called EU refugee crisis, five Schengen zone Member
States, namely Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and Norway have introduced
and repeatedly prolonged internal border controls citing fear of ‘secondary movements
of asylum seekers. In March 2016, the European Commission’s “Back to Schengen” Roadmap
presented a timeline which was supposed to address the concerns of these Member States,
namely (emphasis added):7
Several legislative initiatives and actions undertaken by the Union in order to reinforce its
external border management (European Coast and Border Guard, return to a full application of
EU asylum law provisions by the Hellenic Republic, stepping up of the implementation of the
emergency relocation scheme, the EU-Turkey Statement) should also be in place and fully
operational without delay and thus further contribute to a substantial reduction in the secondary
movements of irregular migrants.8
The plan was initially committed to get back to the ‘full’ application of Schengen
acquis by September 2017. This Paper provides a detailed examination of the measures
undertaken at the EU and national levels to achieve this goal. It does so while considering
that the concerned Member States’ decisions to maintain internal border checks currently
persist, despite all the envisaged time limits established in Article 29 SBC having expired
(Section 2 of this Paper).
In the meantime, decisions to introduce and endure internal police checks which may
amount to border controls have ended up before the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU). This Paper scrutinises the standards developed by the Court of Luxembourg
to assess the compliance of EU Member States’ ‘spot checks’ practices at internal borders, in
particular when these checks are applied in the absence of the (formal) temporary
reintroduction of border controls (Section 3). Furthermore, the EU has recently witnessed the
erection of external and internal border walls and fences which different Member States have
built with the aim of diverting or preventing asylum applicants from reaching and transiting
through the EU. As this Paper shows, these practices are not envisaged under the Schengen
governance mechanism, and serious doubts exist at to their compatibility with the SBC and
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Section 4).
One of the most important policy developments which has occurred since the previous Study
was published is the new Commission’s proposal on the temporary reintroduction of internal
border controls. In parallel, the European Commission has issued a set of recommendations
to gradually resume Dublin transfers to Greece from 15 March 2017.9 According to these
recommendations, asylum applicants who entered the EU ‘irregularly’ via Greece after 15
March 2017 and asked for asylum in another EU Member State could be transferred back
6 European Commission (2016), Assessment of Greece's Action Plan to remedy the serious deficiencies identified in
the 2015 evaluation on the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of management of the external border,
COM(2016) 220, Op. cit., p.4.
7 European Commission (2016), Back to Schengen - A roadmap, COM(2016) 120, Op. cit.
8 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Council Implementing Decision setting out a recommendation for
temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area
at risk, COM(2016) 275 final, Brussels, 4.5.2016.
9 European Commission (2017) Recommendation of 8.12.2016 addressed to the Member States on the resumption
of transfers to Greece under Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013, C(2016) 8525 final, Brussels, 8.12.2016.
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following the Dublin III Regulation. The Briefing Paper analyses the content and implications
of both initiatives (Section 5).
The Briefing Paper also looks at another key initiative adopted by the EU in response to the
‘refugee crisis’, namely the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG or Frontex) which has
become operation in September 2017. The new Frontex agency has been entrusted with
an extended operational and strategic mandate, including the power to conduct
‘vulnerability assessments’ linked with the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring
Mechanism. The Briefing Paper investigates the increasingly important role attributed to the
EBCG under the European Integrated Border Management concept (Section 6). Specific
attention is paid to the concerns that the key EIBM components, in particular enhanced
cooperation with third countries and the interoperability of existing large-scale information
systems, raise for fundamental rights and the rule of law. Section 7 draws conclusions on the
basis of this analysis and makes some innovative policy recommendations.
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2. INTERNAL BORDER CONTROLS
Since mid-2016, a total of ten Schengen States have reintroduced (or prolonged) temporary
internal border controls in their territories on the basis of the Schengen Borders Code for
various reasons. This Section examines the justifications provided in their notifications for the
reintroductions of temporary internal border controls. It provides a summary of the findings
presented in Annex 3 of this Study which provides an updated and detailed overview of the
grounds, justifications, timeframe and legal basis used by each of these states in their
reintroduction of internal border checks.
2.1. Temporary reintroduction of border controls as a reaction to the
refugee humanitarian crisis: the Council Implementing Decisions
The Council adopted on 12 May 2016, based on a proposal from the Commission,10 an
Implementing Decision “setting out a Recommendation for temporary internal border control
in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk”.11
The Implementing Decision was adopted on the basis of Article 29(2) of the Schengen Borders
Code (SBC). The factual basis underpinning the Council Implementing Decisions was the
“unprecedented migratory and refugee crisis [the EU is facing] following a sharp increase of
mixed migratory flows since 2015”, leading to “serious deficiencies” in external border
controls “resulting in important secondary movements, causing a serious threat to public
policy or internal security” and “putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without
internal border control”.12
The triggering of Article 29(2) SBC by the Council meant in essence that the five Member
States concerned, i.e. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, were permitted to
retain their temporary internal border controls for an additional period of up to six months
(i.e. up to 12 November 2016). In their notifications, all five Member States have stated their
intention to “comply” with the Council’s Implementing Decision (see Figure 1 below). The
territorial scope and the types of border controls permitted pursuant to the Council
Implementing Decision were:
 Austria at the Austrian-Hungarian land border and Austrian-Slovenian land border;
 Germany at the German-Austrian land border;
 Denmark in the Danish ports with ferry connections to Germany and at the Danish-
German land border;
 Sweden in the Swedish harbours in the Police Region South and West and at the
Öresund bridge; and
 Norway in the Norwegian ports with ferry connections to Denmark, Germany and
Sweden.
In short, the permitted scope of temporary internal border controls enumerated above
amounted to the Council allowing Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden to
maintain their existing temporary internal border controls. The previous study considered that
“there seems to be a containment policy at work, which will gradually squeeze the space for
controls down to nothing”.13 This strategy of squeezing the spaces of controls has
however not prevented the controls from continuing. The Council has subsequently “re-
triggered” Article 29(2) SBC three times, for periods of three months and six months.14 Each
10 Commission (2016), Proposal for a Council Implementing Decision setting out a recommendation for temporary
internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk,
COM(2016) 275 final.
11 Council of the EU (2016), Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/894 of 12 May 2016 setting out a
recommendation for temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning
of the Schengen area at risk, OJ L 151, 8.6.2016, pp. 8-11.
12 Council of the EU (2016), Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/894, op cit., recitals 1, 10-11, 15
13 Guild et al. (2016), op. cit., p. 54.
14 Council of the EU (2016), Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1989 of 11 November 2016 setting out a
recommendation for prolonging temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall
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time, all five Member States have followed the Council’s “recommendation” and maintained
their internal border controls. Neither the territorial scope nor the types of internal border
controls have differed between the four Article 29 SBC-based Council Implementing Decisions.
It is surprising to note the justification for the continued maintenance of the temporary
reintroduced internal border controls. All three subsequent Council Implementing Decisions
note, in the recitals that despite the reduced migratory flows and the progress made by
Greece in external border management, the “persistence” of “an important number of
irregular migrants still [remaining] in Greece” continues to seriously threaten public policy
and internal security and continues to put at risk the overall functioning of the Schengen area.
Temporary reintroduction of internal border controls on the basis of Article 29 SBC is limited
to periods of up to six months, and the total period of temporary internal border controls may
not exceed two years (Article 29(1) and (2) SBC). Furthermore, Article 29 SBC may only be
invoked for a maximum of four times (in other words, the period may be prolonged no more
than three times).With Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/818, the maximum
number of prolongations was reached, entailing the end of the Article 29 SBC-based
temporary internal border controls resulting from the “migratory crisis and consequent
secondary movements of irregular migrants”. The Commission has also recognised that the
Article 29 SBC-procedure can no longer be invoked in these circumstances in its
Communication “on preserving and strengthening Schengen” of 27 September 2017, noting
in particular that “[t]he latest reports from the Schengen States under the third and last
prolongation confirm the steady trend that the overall situation has greatly improved since
the beginning of the migratory crisis”.15
In the “Questions & Answers” accompanying the Commission’s Press Release on “Preserving
and strengthening Schengen to improve security and safeguard Europe’s freedoms” on 27
September 2017,16 the Commission notes specifically (emphasis added):
At the expiry of the current internal border controls in November, following the third and final
prolongation legally possible authorised by the Council for Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden
and Norway (pursuant to Article 29 of the Schengen Borders Code) in May this year, the
exceptional circumstances resulting from the context of the unprecedented migratory and
refugee crisis which started in 2015, the deficiencies in the external border management
by Greece and the secondary movements resulting from these deficiencies can no
longer be invoked to justify reintroduction or prolongation of internal border controls
].17
As it will be seen below, this has not precluded Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway
and Sweden from prolonging temporary internal border controls on this exact same
factual basis.
2.2. Temporary reintroduction of border controls as a reaction to the
refugee crisis: post-Council Implementing Decisions
The fact that the Commission (and the Council) may no longer invoke Article 29 SBC has
meant that the “affected” Schengen States intending to prolong (or “temporarily reintroduce”)
internal border controls have attempted to seek solace in the remaining procedures of the
SBC (e.g. Article 25 SBC). It is highly questionable whether Schengen States would
be permitted to prolong their internal border controls under Article 25 SBC on the
functioning of the Schengen area at risk, OJ L 306, 15.11.2016, p. 13–15; Council of the EU (2017), Council
Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/246 of 7 February 2017 setting out a Recommendation for prolonging temporary
internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk, OJ
L 36, 11.2.2017, p. 59–61; Council of the EU (2017), Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/818 of 11 May 2017
setting out a Recommendation for prolonging temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting
the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk, OJ L 122, 13.5.2017, p. 73–75.
15 Commission (2017), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
preserving and strengthening Schengen, COM(2017) 570 final, 27.9.2017, p. 4.
16 Commission (2017), “State of the Union 2017 - Preserving and strengthening Schengen to improve security and
safeguard Europe's freedoms”, European Commission – Press release IP/17/3407.
17 Commission (2017), “Questions & Answers: Preserving and strengthening the Schengen area”, European
Commission – Fact Sheet MEMO/17/3408.
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same factual basis (namely the “migratory crisis and resulting secondary movement of
undocumented and irregular migrants”). As noted, the European Commission has stressed
that the “migratory crisis” may no longer be used as a justification for retaining internal border
controls under the SBC.18
This has not, apparently, dissuaded the “affected” Schengen States (i.e. Austria, Denmark,
Germany, Norway and Sweden) from invoking Article 25 SBC in order to further prolong their
internal border controls. Despite the wording of the notifications as “temporary
reintroductions”, it is clear that the intention of these States is to prolong the internal
border controls resulting from the perceived threat of “secondary movement of
irregular migrants”. This is clear as all five Schengen States seem to lament the lack of
possibility for the prolongation of Article 29 SBC, noting the persistence of the “serious threat
to public policy and internal security” resulting from the “serious deficiencies in the external
border management”. As an example, the Austrian notification refers solely to the
circumstances which underpinned the four Council Implementing Decisions on the basis of
Article 29 SBC.19 Germany similarly considers the persisting “deficiencies” in the external
border controls and secondary irregular movements as justifying their prolongation
(“temporary reintroduction”) of internal border controls.20
Seemingly to circumvent this incompatibility, some of the notifications have notably
explicitly linked the (secondary) movements of irregular migrants to terrorism.
Denmark, for example, notes that “the large number of irregular migrants and failed asylum
seekers present in our neighbouring countries that are waiting to be returned to their country
of origin or transit poses a real security threat, as there is a risk that some terrorist group will
exploit their vulnerable situation” (emphasis added).21 Sweden, in lamenting the end of the
Article 29 SBC-based prolongation, notes that the “shortcomings in the protection of the
external borders persist and contribute to this threat, as they enable potential terrorists and
other criminals to enter the Schengen territory unnoticed”.22 Norway considers that the
“shortcomings in the protection of the external borders and significant irregular secondary
migration within the Schengen area … creates serious threats to public security and order,
with a risk of persons suspected of having terrorist intentions posing as refugees”.23
Concerning the period of “temporary reintroduction”/prolongation of the internal borders, all
of the aforementioned Schengen States except Germany have opted for the maximum total
period permitted under Article 25 SBC, i.e. six months (see Figure 1 below).24 Little to no
attention is given in the notifications to the reason why, in accordance with Article
25 SBC, these Schengen States consider that the “foreseeable duration of the
18 Ibid.
19 Austrian Delegation (2017), Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the Austrian internal
borders in accordance with Regulation 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code), Brussels, Council Document 13207/17, 13.10.2017.
20 German Delegation (2017a), Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the German internal
borders in accordance with Regulation 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code), Brussels, Council Document 13142/17, 12.10.2017.
21 Danish Delegation (2017), Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the Danish internal
borders in accordance with Articles 25 and 27 of Regulation 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) , Brussels, Council Document 13141/17, 12.10.2017.
22 Swedish Delegation (2017), Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the Swedish internal
borders in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement
of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), Brussels, Council Document 13203/17, 13.10.2017.
23 Norwegian Delegation (2017), Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the Norwegian
internal borders in accordance with Articles 25 and 27 of Regulation 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing
the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), Brussels, Council Document 13205/17,
13.10.2017.
24 Germany originally also notified its intention to temporarily introduce/prolong internal border controls for a period
of six months (see German Delegation (2017a), Council Document 13141/17, op. cit.). In a subsequent notification
on 11 December 2017, Germany notified of its intention, for the same reasons, “reintroduce border controls for a
limited period of up to 30 days and prolong them for renewable periods of up to 30 days within a period not exceeding
six months” (see German Delegation (2017b), Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the
German internal borders in accordance with Regulation 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), Brussels, Council Document 15828/17, 15.12.2017).
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serious threat” exceeds 30 days. In line with the Schengen framework, this entails that
all five States will retain internal border controls until May 2018.
It is questionable, however, whether May 2018 will truly see the removal of internal borders
in these states. In a “non-paper” on 5 September 2017, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany
and Norway call on the Commission to propose amendments to the SBC, extending the
periods of temporary internal border controls under Article 25 SBC to three months each, with
a total period of up to four years.25 This call seems to have been picked up by the Commission,
as it submitted a proposal for the amendment of the Articles 25 and 27 SBC in order to provide
for (slight) amendment to the permissible periods of temporary reintroduction/prolongation
of internal border controls (See Section 5 below).26
There is no public information available on whether the European Commission has,
to date, examined the compatibility of these Schengen States’ notifications with the
Schengen Borders Code, particularly in light of its own position that the “migratory crisis
and secondary movement” can no longer be invoked to justify or prolong internal border
controls.
A letter from the German government dated 26 January 2018 seems to indicate that some
form of informal exchange has taken place between the European Commission and Germany.
The document refers to a letter from the European Commission dated 22 December 2017,
and passages in this document seem to imply that a certain degree of scrutiny and follow up
may have been exercised by the Commission regarding the scope and legality of the current
German measures, including passages such as (emphases added):
 “Given their lower intensity and smaller scope, they are different from
comprehensive checks at the external borders in accordance with Article 8 Schengen
Borders Code.”
 “For example, since 12 December we have further modified the intensity of internal
border controls with regard to air carriers from Greece operating flights to the federal
territory. For instance, flights checked already at the airport of departure in
Greece are no longer fully checked upon arrival at a German airport. Instead,
the border police carries out only random controls. This significantly reduces
interference with cross-border passenger traffic while meeting security needs.”
 “Being aware of the significance of temporary internal border controls in a common
area where there are usually no internal border controls, I would like to state that
it is currently necessary to carry out such controls from a national point of
view. Furthermore, I would like to emphasize that, despite the number of
complaints, there is no substantiated evidence that internal border controls are
carried out in a disproportionate manner at Germany’s air and land borders. Carrying
out temporary internal border controls in a national threat situation is an integral
part of the Member States’ national sovereignty and should not be
undermined by excessive reporting requirements.”
The emphasised sentences seem to indicate a response to comments made in the European
Commission’s letter dated 22 December 2017. They reveal that the squeezing strategy by the
Commission to limit the spaces and intensity of controls is still being effectively pursued. Also
noteworthy is the reference in the German letter to “the number of complaints” which seem
to have been lodged against the German internal border controls.
25 n.n. (2017), “Non-paper from Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Norway: Proposal for a targeted
amendment to Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code concerning the re-establishment of internal border controls”,
5 September, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/oct/eu-schengen-internal-border-controls-
proposal-at-dk-fr-de-no.pdf.
26 Commission (2017), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation
(EU) 2016/399 as regards the rules applicable to the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders,
Brussels, COM(2017) 571 final, 27.9.2017.
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Figure 1. Timeline of temporary internal border controls as a reaction to the refugee
crisis as permitted under the SBC - 2015-2018
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2.3. Temporary reintroduction of border controls: France
Since its first notification on 15 October 2015, France has continuously maintained
(temporarily reintroduced) internal border controls (see Figure 2 below). The scope of these
internal border controls has remained consistent throughout, broadly covering all French air
and sea borders and French land borders with its European neighbours. The first notification
on 15 October 2015 covered the period of 13 November to 13 December 2015 and was
justified on the basis of the COP21 UN climate change conference taking place in Paris.27 The
subsequent terrorist attacks in France in 2015, 2016 and 2017 and the declaration (and
extensions) of the French state of emergency have formed the basis of nearly all French
notifications of reintroducing or prolonging internal border controls (see Figure 2 below).
In all of these cases, the French government relied on the provisions of Article 25 SBC (and
previously on Article 23 SBC of 2006). A question arising concerning the French temporary
internal border controls is whether this has occurred in accordance with Article 25 SBC.
Starting from the French notification following the Paris terrorist attack on 13 November
2015,28 Article 25 SBC (former Article 23) would have permitted maintaining temporary
internal border controls from November 2015 until May 2016 (i.e. six months). The French
government could not therefore rely on the events of the Paris terrorist attack in 2015 to
justify a prolongation beyond May 2016. Whether coincidental or intentional, the following
period of temporary internal border controls from 27 May to 26 July 2016 was based on France
hosting the UEFA Euro 2016 and the 2016 Tour de France.29
The terrorist attack in Nice on 14 July 2016 precipitated a new period of the state of
emergency in France (lasting up to 31 October 2017). Following these events, the French
government notified its intention to “temporarily reintroduce” internal border controls, first
from 27 July 2016 to 26 January 2017 (i.e. the maximum period of six months permissible
under Article 25 SBC).30 Subsequent French notifications “prolonged” this period of internal
border controls to 15 July 2017 and 31 October 2017 respectively,31 each coinciding with the
extension of the state of emergency in France. It is particularly the notification of 26
December 2016 (concerning the internal border controls from 27 January to 15 July 2017)
which is concerning. The only difference in factual circumstances between the French
notification of 25 July and 26 December 2016 is the extension of the state of
emergency in France. It is questionable whether there were sufficiently distinct
factual circumstances posing “a serious threat to public policy or internal security”
which would justify a new period of temporary internal border controls ex Article
25 SBC (see Figure 2 below).
27 French Delegation (2015), Temporary reintroduction of border controls at the French internal borders in accordance
with Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), Brussels, Council Document 13171/15, 22.10.2015.
28 French Delegation (2015), Temporary reintroduction of border controls at the French internal borders in accordance
with Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), Brussels, Council Document 15181/1/15 REV 1,
15.12.2015.
29 French Delegation (2016), Temporary reintroduction of border controls at the French internal borders in accordance
with Articles 25 and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of
persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), Brussels, Council Document 9506/16, 27.5.2016.
30 French Delegation (2016), Temporary reintroduction of border controls at the French internal borders in accordance
with Articles 25 and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of
persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), Brussels, Council Document 11514/16, 27.7.2016. Of note is the
link claimed by the French government between terrorism and migratory movements, as the notification refers to
“[t]he current migratory situation reinforces the link between the terrorist threat and the crossing of borders. In fact,
the volume of flows at the EU’s external borders and the geographical proximity of migratory routes to the regions
at the source of the terrorist threat facilitate the arrival in the Schengen area and national territory of individuals …
who might be plotting a terrorist attack in France” (emphases added). A similar reference to the link between
migration and terrorism is invoked in the French notification of 26 December 2016 (see French Delegation (2017),
Temporary reintroduction of border controls at the French internal borders in accordance with Articles 25 and 27 of
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code), Brussels, Council Document 5055/17, 10.1.2017).
31 See French Delegation (2017), Council Document 5055/17, op. cit. and French Delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the French internal borders in accordance with Articles 25 and 27 of Regulation
(EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders
Code), Brussels, Council Document 10365/17, 21.6.2017 respectively.
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Similarly, reference can be made to the French notifications of 16 June and 3 October 2017,
which “reintroduced” temporary internal border controls from 16 July to 31 October 2017 and
1 November 2017 to 30 April 2018 respectively. Assuming that the terrorist attacks in France
in 2017 merit a ‘novel situation’ of threat justifying the temporary reintroduction of internal
border controls on 16 July 2017, the October 2017 French notification seems to be based on
(nearly identical) factual circumstances, with the principal difference being the “end” of the
state of emergency in France on 31 October 2017 and the subsequent adoption of the French
law on internal security and the fight against terrorism. It is inconceivable how changes
in the French legal acquis could be considered as sufficient to permit temporary
internal border controls extending past the six-month limit stipulated in Article 25
SBC.
The compatibility of the French reintroduction of internal border controls has been the subject
of a ruling of the Council of State (Conseil d’État) on 28 December 2017.32 The case was
presented by the Association Nationale d’Assistance aux Frontières pour les étrangers et
autres (including GISTI and Cimade) asking the Council of State to annul the French
Government’s decision to prolong the reintroduction of internal border checks between 1
November 2017 and April 2018.33
When assessing the legality of the latest written notification by France, the Council of State
recognises that since 13 November 2015 the French Government has asked nine times for a
prolongation of internal border controls, which has never exceeded six months. It concludes
that in light of evidence provided by the Government concerning the “high level of terrorist
threat in France” this renewed threat constitutes a ground justifying a new application of
Article 25 SBC because of “the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration
exceeds 30 days” (para. 8 of the Decision). Part of the French Council of State’s ruling
considered whether the French internal border control reintroductions complied with the
duration limits imposed in Article 25 SBC. The Council of State, referring to the Commission
Recommendation C(2017) 6560, considered that
D’autre part, si l’article 25 précité limite la durée maximale de la réintroduction d’un contrôle aux
frontières intérieures à six mois, il ne fait pas obstacle, en cas de nouvelle menace ou de menace
renouvelée pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure, à la mise en place à nouveau d’un contrôle
aux frontières pour une autre période d’une durée maximale de 6 mois … [emphasis added]34
However, this reading is directly incompatible with the current version of Article 25 SBC, which
only applies to “new threats”, and cannot be applied to “renewed ones” (where Article 25(2)
SBC would apply). This (mis)interpretation by the Council of State of the limitative nature of
the Article 25-SBC period of six months has been criticised by a number of academics,
including professors Paul Cassia and Sébastian Platon.35 As noted by Platon, the reasoning of
the Council of State is troubling for two reasons, as 1) “the recommendation in question
is not binding, and therefore cannot be used as a ground for a legal reasoning”, and 2) “the
Council of State misquotes the recommendation in question. … The reasoning of the
Council of State is therefore extremely misleading when it extends this possibility to situation
of a renewed threat to public policy or internal security. Indeed, the threat invoked by the
Government is not new in nature. It is merely the continuation of the threat that justified
the initial reintroduction of border control back in 2015”.36
32 Conseil d’État 28 December 2017, Associations nationale d’assitance aux frontiers pour les étrangers et autres,
Case No. 415291, available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/Decisions-Avis-Publications/Decisions/Selection-des-
decisions-faisant-l-objet-d-une-communication-particuliere/Conseil-d-Etat-28-decembre-2017-Association-
nationale-d-assistance-aux-frontieres-pour-les-etrangers-et-autres.
33 Ibid, para. 1.
34 Ibid, para. 7.
35 See Cassia, P. (2017), “Le Conseil d’État decode Schengen”, 29 December, https://blogs.mediapart.fr/paul-
cassia/blog/291217/le-conseil-d-etat-decode-schengen; Platon, S. (2018), “30 days, six months… forever? Border
control and the French Council of State”, Verfassungsblog on matters constitutional, 9 January,
https://verfassungsblog.de/30-days-six-months-forever-border-control-and-the-french-council-of-state/.
36 Platon (2018), op. cit.
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The Council of State further concluded that the French measures only affect the principle of
free movement of persons in a manner which is proportionate to the public policy goal
pursued; moreover, it also held that the decision does not have as an objective or in effect a
violation of the right to asylum. It therefore decided not to refer the question before the CJEU
in Luxembourg and declared inadmissible the claims by the Association Nationale d’Assistance
aux Frontières pour les étrangers et autres.
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Figure 2. Timeline of temporary internal border controls permitted under Article 25
SBC (France) - 2015-2018
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2.4. Other temporary reintroductions of internal border controls since
2016
Between mid-2016 and December 2017, eight countries have temporarily reintroduced
internal Schengen borders owing to public security/public order concerns resulting from
events taking place within their territories. Aside from the French temporary reintroduction
of internal borders resulting from the UEFA Euro Cup 2016 and the Tour de France 2016 (see
above), these included:
 Poland (4 July – 2 August 2016): NATO Summit (8 and 9 July), the World Youth Days
(25 to 31 July) and the Pilgrimage of the Holy Father to Poland (28 to 31 July);
 Malta (21 January – 9 February 2017): Malta Informal Summit 2017 (3 February) and
the Joint Valetta Action Plan Senior Officials Meeting (8 to 9 February);
 Portugal (10-14 May 2017): Pilgrimage of the Holy Father to Fatima-Portugal (12-13
May 2017);
 Italy (10-30 May 2017): G7 Summit (26-27 May 2017);
 Germany (12 June – 11 July 2017): G20 Summit in Hamburg (7-8 July 2017);37
 Norway (26 August – 25 September 2017): UCI Road World Championship (16-24
September 2017); and
 Sweden (12-19 November 2017): Social Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth (17
November 2017).
37 In this respect, the original notification on 15 May 2017 did not contain the specific dates of the reintroduction of
internal borders owing to ‘security concerns’. A subsequent notification by Germany less than a week before the start
of the temporary internal border controls provided the specific dates.
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3. INTERNAL POLICE CHECKS IN LIGHT OF EU BENCHMARKS
The SBC allows for the exercise of police powers by EU Member States competent authorities
as long as they are not effectively equivalent to ‘border controls’. Article 23 SBC states
that the lifting of internal border checks “shall not affect Member States’ exercise of police
powers in accordance to national law”. This same provision stipulates that internal police
checks will not be considered equivalent to border checks when they meet the following four
conditions:
1. do not have border control as an objective;
2. are based on general police information and experience regarding possible threats
to public security and aim, in particular, to combat cross-border crime;
3. are devised and executed in a manner clearly distinct from systematic checks on
persons at the external borders;
4. are carried out on the basis of spot-checks.
The legality and exact scope of the ways in which internal police checks are being
implemented by Member States’ law enforcement authorities has proved to be controversial
in practice. The CJEU jurisprudence has provided important indications for assessing the
compliance with EU law of Member States ‘spot checks’ practices at internal borders which
are applied in the absence of the (formal) temporary reintroduction of border controls.
The Luxembourg Court has stipulated in previous judgements that “the exercise of police
powers may not be considered equivalent to the exercise of border checks when the police
measures do not have border control as an objective … and executed in a manner clearly
distinct from systematic checks on persons at the external borders and are carried out on the
basis of spot-checks” (emphasis added).38 The CJEU has held that their compliance with the
SBC “must be ensured by the details and limitations contained in the framework for the
practical exercise of the police powers enjoyed by the Member States, a framework which
should be such as to avoid such an equivalent effect” (emphasis added).39 The Court has put
special emphasis on the need for this national framework to allow for the testing of the
purposes of defining the intensity, frequency and selectivity of police identity checks.
The specifics of that framework of intervention where addressed in the recent Case C-9/16,
Criminal proceedings against A of 21 June 2017 in relation to Germany. The case
concerned the crossing on foot by the applicant of the ‘Europe bridge’ from Strasbourg
(France) to Kehl (Germany), where he proceeded to the railway station. There he was checked
by two officers of the German Federal Police on patrol at the railway station. On the basis of
German legislation (point (3) of Paragraph 23(1) of the BPolG), those officers carried out an
identity check. The applicant forcibly resisted the check and was charged with a criminal
offence of resisting an enforcement officer under Paragraph 113(1) of the German Criminal
Code.
The domestic German court asked two preliminary questions for interpretation before the
CJEU: First, the extent to which Article 67.2 TFEU and Articles 20 and 21 of SBC preclude
national law from granting the police the power to check within an area of 30 km the identity
of the person “irrespective of the behaviour and other specific circumstances” with a view to
preventing or terminating unlawful entry or preventing criminal offences in the absence of
temporary reintroduction of border controls; and second, if EU law precludes police the power
“to stop and question any person on a train or on the premises of the railways, with a view
to preventing or terminating unlawful entry into that Member State, and to request that
person to hand over for examination the identity documents or border crossing papers”.
In answering these questions, the CJEU set a number of ‘legal standards or
benchmarks’ for determining the lawfulness of the national framework, chiefly:
 First, it must be sufficiently clear and precise so as to allow these police checks to be
tested (Para. 41); national law must provide the details or limitations on the power
38 Refer to judgments of 22 June 2010, Melki andAbdeli, C-188/10 and C-189/10, EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 70,
and of 19 July 2012, Adil, C-278/12 PPU, EU:C:2012:508, paragraph 54.
39 Judgment of 19 July 2012, Adil, C-278/12 PPU, EU:C:2012:508, paragraph 70.
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
22
conferred (Para. 38), in particular in relation to the intensity and frequency of the
checks (para. 57 of the judgement);
 Second, national legislation must guide the discretion of police authorities in the
practical application of identity checks (Para. 39), so that “first, it is restricted to the
border area of the Member State with other Member States and, second, it does not
depend upon the behaviour of the person checked or on specific circumstances giving
rise to a risk of breach of public order” (Para. 39);
 Third, “the more extensive the evidence of the existence of a possible equivalent
effect, … the greater the need for strict detailed rules and limitations laying down the
conditions for the exercise by national police powers in a border area and for strict
application of those detailed rules and limitations” (Para. 40). This means an
incremental requirement of legal certainty the higher the evidence on existence
of equivalent effect is.
 Fourth, the public objectives of police checks must be different from ‘border controls’
as stipulated in Article 2.10 of the SBC (Para. 42).40
In the absence of the above, the Court held in Case C-9/16 that it would not be possible to
assess whether “those checks, first, are selective and thus not systematic like border checks
and, second, are police measures applied on the basis of spot-checks.” The CJEU concluded
that it is for the domestic national court to determine whether the national legislation complies
with these standards (Para. 61).
As regards the extent to which the SBC precludes national law permitting police authorities
to carry out, on board trains and on the premises of the railways of that Member State,
identity or border crossing document checks on any person, the Court held that “the objective
pursued by the provision at issue does not in itself mean that the checks carried out pursuant
to the BPolG [Federal Police Law] have an effect equivalent to border checks” (Paras. 51 and
68). However, it stated that in contrast with general police identity checks “the sole objective
of these checks on trains and railways is to prevent or terminate illegal entry into German
federal territory, which might indicate that those checks have an effect equivalent to border
checks”.
The CJEU held that German law did not “lay down any special rules concerning where the
checks provided for in that provision may take place and thus does not distinguish between
carrying out such controls in a border area and carrying them out elsewhere in the national
territory” (Para. 69). Here the Court brought back the incremental legal certainty
benchmark (Para. 72). There is moreover another German case pending on a preliminary
ruling dealing with a similar issue.41
In the Bi-Annual Report on the functioning of the Schengen area (1 November 2011-
30 April 2012)42 the European Commission issued Guidelines in Annex II “to ensure a
coherent implementation and interpretation of the Schengen acquis”, including police
measures in internal border zones. They stated the need to evaluate how these checks are
implemented in practice so as to check their proportionality in light of their objectives.
The Guidelines stipulated “when the Commission is confronted with serious allegations of
borders checks in internal border zones, as stated in the 2010 report, it needs to seek concrete
40 According to this provision “‘border checks’ means the checks carried out at border crossing points to ensure that
persons may be authorised to enter the territory of the Member States or authorised to leave it.”
41 Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Kehl (Germany) lodged on 21 June 2016 — Criminal
proceedings against C. (Case C-346/16) (2016/C 335/46) dealing with the following questions: First, does EU law
preclude national legislation which grants the police authorities of the Member State in question the power to search
for an article, irrespective of the behaviour of the person carrying this article and of specific circumstances, with a
view to impeding or stopping unlawful entry into the territory of that Member State or to preventing certain criminal
acts directed against the security or protection of the border or committed in connection with the crossing of the
border, in the absence of any temporary reintroduction of border controls? Second, does EU preclude national
legislation or practice which permits a criminal court in that Member State to use evidence to the detriment of the
accused, although that evidence was obtained as a result of a State measure that infringes EU law?’ It is likely that
the CJEU will leave here also to the national court to determine whether the above-mentioned EU standards are met
in the domestic legal system.
42 European Commission, Biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 November 2011 - 30 April 2012,
COM(2012) 230 final, Brussels, 16.5.2012.
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statistical information from Member States; it may therefore request the Member State
concerned to submit information on checks performed at the border during a given period
(time, locations, reasons and the national authority responsible) as well as on how these have
contributed to reaching the aims laid down in national legislation or strategies, i.e. on
combating cross-border crime.” (emphasis added). In this regard, the Guidelines stipulated
that “In this context, the existence of a risk assessment and the fact that the Member State
concerned is taking measures not only in the internal border zone but in other parts of its
territory will be taken into account by the Commission” (pp. 16-17).
The European Commission presented a Recommendation on proportionate police checks
and police cooperation in the Schengen area on May 2017,43 which reviews previous
Commission Guidelines issued in 2012. The main message of the Recommendation is “to
encourage” Member States “to better use their police powers and to give precedence to police
checks before deciding on the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls” (Para.
13), specifically through the intensification of police checks across the entire territory and
“main transport routes, including border areas” and making use of “modern technologies to
monitor vehicles and traffic flows”, which in any case need to be “subject to the applicable
rules concerning camera surveillance, including data protection standards” (Para. 8).
The 2017 Recommendation puts a lot of emphasis on “the prerogatives of the Member States
with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”
(Para. 4), which within the remits of the Schengen governance system constitutes a rather
sensitive statement. Indeed, insisting on the prerogatives of Member States on internal
security could be interpreted as the European Commission allowing for a back door to reverse
Europeanisation and ‘Lisbonisation’ as regards common EU border policy and Schengen.
It is on the other hand welcomed that the Recommendation states that measures should not
“lead to obstacles to the free movement of persons and good which would not be necessary,
justified and proportionate to those threats to public policy or internal security and that it
fully respects fundamental rights and in particular the principle of non-
discrimination” (para. 14). The Recommendation puts also emphasis on the need to take
the neighbouring Member State views, concerns and interests into account when conducting
these police checks, particularly at time of removing legal and operational barriers “to the full
use of all cross-border operational police cooperation tools”.
It adds however dubious and rather problematic statements, such as in paragraph 19: “As
demonstrated by the recent migratory crisis, uncontrolled secondary movements of irregular
migrants may pose a serious threat to public policy or internal security”. Or in Paragraph 6:
“Such checks may provide more efficient than internal border controls, notably as they are
more flexible than static border controls at specific border crossing points and can be adapted
more easily to evolving risks”. Similarly, it is precisely this flexibility in the use of police
identity checks which may blur the line between what is and what is not equivalent
to a border control, or what constitutes a disproportionate policing within the
common Schengen area.
Furthermore, the Commission Recommendation makes use of language which blurs in
certain passages the notions of “public security or internal security” with asylum.
This is most visible when it merges threats like “terrorism” and “secondary movements of
persons who have irregularly crossed the external borders”, which may include asylum
seekers. Each of these phenomena call for a separated or differentiated assessment of their
nature, scale and policy responses. What the Recommendation does not say expressly is that
the proportionality test of these national police measures remains in the hands of
the European Commission and has been ‘Europeanised’ in the scope of the Schengen
governance framework.
The daily delivery of the CJEU benchmarks calls moreover for a regular evaluation of the
ways in which these internal policy checks and any joint police cross-border
operational activities (joint patrols and operations, or Joint Investigation Teams, JITs)
between the two or several Member States are actually carried out in practice in light of the
43 European Commission, Recommendation
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SBC and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The notion of “public policy and internal
security” when used in the implementation of EU law or in policing activities directly or
indirectly relevant from an EU law perspective must be read in light of EU Treaties, the SBC
standards and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
There is a substantial gap in knowledge regarding the quantitative uses and qualitative effects
of internal police checks in EU Member States. Such a gap makes a proportionality and legality
assessment unfeasible in practice. This calls for a comprehensive and systematic
overview or statistics on the use of these police internal controls by all Member
States. How many checks have been performed and what does this tell us about the
proportionality of these police actions so as to prevent police from becoming de facto guards
of blurred borders – and what are the exact criteria for the selection of persons to be checked?
The German Government has provided useful statistics on the use of controls based on the
BPolG in response to Parliamentary questions about internal police checks: In 2015, about
two million checks were performed on the basis of Article 23 (1) (3) BPolG (identity checks
within 30 km area) and 1.5 million in 2016.44 A way to gather this information could be to
systematically record the uses of the Schengen Information System (SIS) II by national
actors. The recorded data could be used as an indicator illustrating how often and which
people are checked. These data could thus be used to determine whether police
identity checks de facto amount to border control.
44 Answers of the German government to parliamentary questions: see BT 18/11058, 1.2.2017, p. 6 ff.
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4. FENCES AT THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BORDERS OF
THE SCHENGEN AREA
Prior to mid-2015 and the outburst of the so-called European humanitarian refugee crisis,
only Spain (completed in 2005 and extended in 2009), Greece (completed in 2012) and
Bulgaria (in response to Greece, completed in 2014) resorted to erecting fences at external
borders, so as to prevent migrants and refugees from reaching their territories. The recent
developments indicate that spaces of exception and “non-places” became the new normal.45
Contrarily to SBC Article 14, which requires that “entry may only be refused by a substantiated
decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal”, an increasing number of Member States
has progressively embarked in the construction of border walls or fences aimed at
indiscriminately preventing the access of migrants and asylum seekers in their national
territories. Without explicit EU rules on setting up fences at the external Schengen borders,
these countries have erected barriers between the EU and third countries (Morocco, Russia),
including pre-accession candidates (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia,
Turkey), as well as an EU Schengen candidate country – Croatia. Fences have been also
constructed within the Schengen area – the fence between Austria and Slovenia (see Figure
3 below, fences are highlighted in red). In a meantime, Spanish practices in Melilla have been
scrutinised by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. This case sets an important
precedent in the context of border walls and fences in the EU.
4.1. Recent developments: Europe erecting fences
Since the emergence of the refugee crisis there has been a noticeable ‘domino effect’
regarding the construction and development of border walls and fences in the EU. The
decisions of single Schengen countries to erect border fences and reintroduce internal border
controls have prompted similar actions in neighbouring countries.46 This domino effect is
illustrated in Annex 2.
In April 2016, it was estimated that:
European countries have built or started 1,200 km of anti-immigrant fencing at a
cost of at least 500 million euros […] That distance is almost 40 percent of the length
of America’s border with Mexico. [emphasis added]47
Both the length of border fencing and the costs related to their establishment have increased
ever since. Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán claimed that as of September 2017
Hungary alone spent EUR 800 million in the construction of border fences and requested EU
to pay half of the price ‘in solidarity’.48 This request was swiftly rejected by the European
Commission, who then responded that EU money is not aimed for the construction of fences
or barriers at the external borders. 49
45 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and J. Vedsted-Hansen (eds.) (2016), Human Rights and the Dark Side of Globalisation:
Transnational law enforcement and migration control, Abingdon: Routledge.
46 Rheindorf  M. & R. Wodak “Borders, Fences, and Limits—Protecting Austria From Refugees: Metadiscursive
Negotiation of Meaning in the Current Refugee Crisis” , Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies Vol. 0, Iss. 0, 2017.
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15562948.2017.1302032).
47 Baczynska, G. & S. Ledwith (2016) “How Europe built fences to keep people out”, REUTERS, 4 April, 2016.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-fences-insight/how-europe-built-fences-to-keep-people-out-
idUSKCN0X10U7.
48 Nielsen, N. (2017) “Hungary demands EU payments for border wall”, EU Observer, Brussels, 1 September 2017,
(https://euobserver.com/migration/138849).
49 Nielsen, N. (2017) “Hungary demands EU payments for border wall”, EU Observer, Brussels, 1 September 2017,
(https://euobserver.com/migration/138849).
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Figure 3. Map of new border fences in the Schengen area*
Source: UNHCR (2017) Border fences and internal border controls in Europe, March 2017.
(https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/55249).
* Lithuania’s fence is along the Kaliningrad Strip (Russian Federation), not with Belarus.
Among the more difficult issues inherent to border walls and fences, there is the role and
responsibility of the EU agencies, such as Frontex/ EBCG, which has deployed officers
assisting the Member States to conduct border controls and surveillance at the
Hungarian/Serbian border. In addition, whereas currently the EU does not directly fund
Member States to cover the razor wire and metal constructions, EU funding can be used for
equipping such fences with surveillance systems, radars, cameras and other equipment. Such
funding is allocated to research projects and security budgets from the External Borders Fund
and Internal Security Fund-Borders.
The recent Transnational Institute (TNI) report indicates that “from 2007-10, EU funds
contributed to the deployment of 545 border surveillance systems covering 8,279 kilometres
of the EU’s external borders and 22,347 items of border surveillance equipment.”50 The same
report highlights, that various projects for militarising EU borders are ongoing including via
50 Jones, Ch. (2017) “Market Forces: The development of the EU Security-Industrial Complex” TNI Report, 25 August
2017. (https://www.tni.org/en/publication/market-forces-the-development-of-the-eu-security-industrial-complex).
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use of drones and other semi-automated systems.51 Yet, should border walls and fences
benefit from such additional EU financial support?
Hungary vs. its neighbours
In response to the European refugee humanitarian crisis Hungary was among the first in
moving towards the building of a razor wire fence as to prevent asylum seekers and migrants
from reaching its territory. The Hungarian government has also trained and employed 3000
‘border hunters’ – whose aim is to protect the fence by arresting and/or returning persons
who crossed the fence.52
In addition, on 4 September 2015 the Hungarian Parliament adopted Act CXL of 2015 on ‘The
Amendment of certain Acts related to the management of mass migration’ (‘Amending Act’),
which came into effect on 15 September 2015.53 These amendments were integrated in the
Hungarian Criminal Code, making it criminal offences to cross the border ‘unlawfully’,
punishable with imprisonment of up to 3 years (Section 352/A of the of the Act C/2012 of the
Criminal Code), to destroy border – up to 5 years (Section 352/B of the of the Act C/2012 of
the Criminal Code), or to obstruct the construction of the border – up to 1 year (Section 352/C
of the of the Act C/2012 of the Criminal Code).
In addition, new amendments were passed in July 2016. These have introduced an
‘operational border regime’ allowing border guards to fast-track border control and return
procedures.54 Already in October 2016, the Frontex Consultative Forum, which is composed
of civil society actors and international organisations including UN agencies such as the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) raised serious concerns with the Fundamental Rights Officer, Frontex and the
Management Board on the situation at the Hungarian-Serbian walled border:
[T]he impact of the new law of July 2016 on border control measures which, amongst
others, obliges officers to return migrants apprehended within 8 km of the border
back to the fence with Serbia. The new restrictive border measures of July 2016 … have
resulted in severely limiting and deterring access to asylum in Hungary and raise
serious concerns with regards to compatibility with international and European law.
[emphasis added]55
The UNHCR was also concerned about the right of access to asylum. Within a working day,
Hungary only accepts up to 10 persons within the so-called transit zone. In some periods, the
number of asylum seekers allowed in the transit zone amounted to only 2 persons per week.56
The broadened notion of ‘migrant smuggling’ as well as increased criminalisation  of migrants
and asylum seekers made the work of civil society and humanitarian organisations providing
assistance or access to justice complicated, by limiting possibilities to access clients.
International human rights organisations gathered evidence that refugees and migrants
51 TNI report indicates that such projects include: “SafeShore (€5.1 million), RANGER (€8 million) and ALFA (€4.6
million) seek to expand border surveillance, particularly through the use of drones. One previous project, TALOS
(€13 million...) even tried to develop an automated border control robot.”
52 Thorpe, N. (2016) “Migrant crisis: Hungary police recruit 'border-hunters'”, BBC News, Budapest, 2 September
2016 (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37259857).
53 BIROSAG (2015) “Communication: “On the amendment of certain Acts related to the management of mass
migration”, 22 September, 2015. (http://birosag.hu/en/media/aktualis/communication-amendment-certain-acts-
related-management-mass-migration).
54 Amended Section 71/A (1) of Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum and newly added Section 5 (1a) of Act LXXXIX of 2007
on State Borders. Description found in Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2016) “Hungary: Recent legal amendments
further destroy access to protection, April-June 2016”, Brief information update by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee,
15 June 2016.
(https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/HHC-Hungary-asylum-legal-amendments-Apr-June-2016.pdf).
55 Frontex Consultative Forum (2017) Fourth Annual Report Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights of
2016, p. 38 – 39.
(http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Consultative_Forum_files/Frontex_Consultative_Forum_annual_report_2
016.pdf).
56 Than K. (2016) “Hungary's anti-migrant policies may violate international law: UNHCR”, Reuters, 12 May, 2016.
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-un/hungarys-anti-migrant-policies-may-violate-
international-law-unhcr-idUSKCN0Y32H9).
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experienced violence from the border guards and the so-called ‘border hunters’.57 The
Hungarian Helsinki Committee has already submitted two cases on the violent border
practices and push-backs on the Hungarian/Serbian border.58
Already, in June 2015 the Hungarian government approved the construction of a border
fence with Serbia, and the construction started in mid-July 2015.59 The border fence was
completed in mid-September 2015. It stretches for 175 km and separates Hungary and
Serbia, leaving few official crossing-points where people could apply for asylum. In February
2016, Hungary announced that it was building a second border wall with Serbia along the
existing fence, which would be even more “effective to hold migrants back”.60
The immediate effect of the construction of the first Hungarian/Serbian wall was the diversion
of people towards Croatia.61 In mid-September 2015, Hungary itself started to build a 348 km
fence with Croatia, which is a Schengen candidate country.62 In mid-October 2015, Hungary
completed the construction of the fence along the border with Croatia.
On September 24, 2015, Hungary began building a razor wire fence with Slovenia, in the
area around the Tornyiszentmiklós-Pince border crossing. This fence inside the Schengen area
was built without informing the Slovenian authorities.63 It was swiftly removed two days later
after bilateral discussions.
In February 2016, Hungary announced its plans to build an additional 450 km-long fencewith
Romania, which is another Schengen candidate country.64 Hungary further threatened to
build a fence along the borders with Ukraine and Slovakia if it finds this necessary to protect
itself from refugees and migrants. To date, the latter plans seem not to have materialised.
Austria vs. Slovenia
On November 2015, Austria began to construct a border fence with Slovenia. Austrian officials
referred to it as a “technical barrier” made out of same razor wire. This contrs was a reversal
of the previous Austrian position on fences. 65 Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann had
criticised border fences built by Hungary and claimed that “Austria’s own ‘technical measures’
would be different”.66 In May 2016 Austria threatened to erect a fence with Italy, in a reaction
to a large number of migrants arriving following Search and Rescue (SAR) operations carried
out by the Italian authorities in Central Mediterranean route. 67 This caused a diplomatic affair
as Italy and Germany were opposed to Austria’s plan to build a fence on the Brenners passage.
57 Carerra et al. (2018 forthcoming)“Policing Mobility Society”, Hart publishing.
58 ECtHR, Khurram v. Hungary, Application No 12625/17; H.K. v. Hungary, Application No 18531/17, Communicated
on 21 December 2017.
59 Kingsley, P. (2015) “Migrants on Hungary's border fence: 'This wall, we will not accept it'”, 22 June, 2015
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/22/migrants-hungary-border-fence-wall-serbia).
60 Dunai, M. (2017) "Hungary starts construction of second border fence", REUTERS, 27 February, 2017.
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-fence/hungary-starts-construction-of-second-
border-fence-idUSKBN16614A).
61Mullen, J., I. Watson and S.  Capelouto (2015) “Migrant crisis: Croatia closes border crossings as thousands stream
in“ CNN, September 18, 2015 (http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/17/world/europe-migrant-crisis/).
62Mullen, J., I. Watson and S.  Capelouto (2015) “Migrant crisis: Croatia closes border crossings as thousands stream
in“ CNN, September 18, 2015 (http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/17/world/europe-migrant-crisis/).
63 Novinite (2015) "Hungary Starts Building Razor-Wire Fence along Border with Slovenia", September 24, 2015.
(http://www.novinite.com/articles/170976/Hungary+Starts+Building+Razor-
Wire+Fence+along+Border+with+Slovenia)
64 Guettridge, N. (2016) "The Great Wall of Europe: Hungary splits continent in two with huge fence to stop migrants",
Express.co.uk, 29 February , 2016. (https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/648269/Hungary-plan-fence-border-
Romania-migrants-refugees-crisis-Viktor-Orban-Schengen).
65 The Local (2015) Razor wire fence appears on Slovenian border, 5 November 2015. (https://www.
thelocal.at/20151105/razor-wire-erected-at-slovenian-border).
66 The Local (2015) Razor wire fence appears on Slovenian border, 5 November 2015. (https:/ /www. thelocal.
at/20151105/razor-wire-erected-at-slovenian-border).
67 Reuters (2016) Italian police, demonstrators clash in protest against Austrian fence, 6 May, 2016.
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-border-brenner/italian-police-demonstrators-clash-in-
protest-against-austrian-fence-idUSKCN0XY07Y).
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Slovenia vs. Croatia
On 11 November 2015, just a week after Austrian fence was started, Slovenians reacted by
building their own fence with Croatia. The Slovenian prime minister also claimed that “the
fence would help control the flow of people. He said his country would not have the resources
to shelter large numbers of migrants over the harsh winter if Austria shut its border, creating
a bottleneck.”68
FYROM vs. Greece
As part of the efforts to block the Western Balkan route, Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) built a fence with Greece in November 2015 and completed it in March
2016. Members of the European Parliament were active on the question as to whether funding
from the EU Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance of EUR 12 million was used for this
purpose and whether it is in line with the “spirit of the pre-accession” and fundamental
rights.69 The European Commission has vaguely answered that EU funding is not intended for
the erection of fences and should be spent in line with the fundamental rights.70 Nevertheless,
the Commission has not further elaborated on the ‘spirit of the pre-accession’, which could
be embedded in the ‘spirit of Schengen Agreement’ and Schengen Borders Code Article 14.
However, while visiting the fence Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos admitted that “[a]ll
our values are in danger today”. 71
Bulgaria vs. Turkey & Greece
By August 2016, Bulgaria completed 30 km long and 3.5-metre-high fence along its borders
with Greece and Turkey near Rezovo city. The border fence was built due to rising fears of
arrivals of migrants and refugees:
Each day, between 150 and 200 illegal immigrants who try to cross the Bulgarian border are
sent back to Turkey.72
Because of the impossibility for an individual assessment it is not clear whether these people
were actually refugees and in need of subsidiary protection. The UNHCR called for the
investigation into Bulgarian border practices amounting to ‘illegal push-backs’. The concerns
were raised after a violent incident was reported claiming that border guards had beaten a
group of Iraqis of Yazidi ethnicity, resulting in two deaths.73 According to Human Rights
Watch:
The European Commission sent a letter to Bulgaria – the first step in legal action – concerning
allegations that it broke EU rules by pushing Syrians back to Turkey, but has since been silent
on the issue.74
Since then, human rights organisations have found further evidence of violence and push-
backs continuing at the Bulgarian border.75 In March 2016 Bulgarian authorities also
threatened to build a 484 km-long fence along the border with Greece, though there was no
68 The Guardian (2015) "Slovenia starts building fence to control flow of refugees", 11 November, 2015
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/11/slovenia-fence-refugees-veliki-obrez).
69 See:  MEP Maria Spyraki (2015) Parliamentary questions, E-014948-15, Question for written answer to the
Commission (Rule 130), 23 November 2015; MEP Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi (2015) 3 December 2015
E-015388-15 Question for written answer to the Commission (Rule 130).
70 European Commission (2016) Parliamentary questions Joint answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
to Written questions: E-015388/15 , E-014948/15 18 March 2016. (http://www.europarl .europa.eu/sides/getDoc
.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2015-015388&language=EN).
71 Baczynska, G. & S. Ledwith (2016) “How Europe built fences to keep people out”, REUTERS, 4 April, 2016.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-fences-insight/how-europe-built-fences-to-keep-people-out-
idUSKCN0X10U7.
72 Oliphant, V. (2016) “Bulgaria builds 30km fence on Turkish border to keep migrants out”, Express.co.uk,
11 August, 2016. (https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/698963/Bulgaria-migrant-crisis-30-kilometre-fence-
Greece-Turkey).
73 UNHCR (2015) “UNHCR calls for an investigation into the death of two Iraqis at the Bulgaria-Turkey border, raises
concerns over border practices”, 31 March 2015, Geneva. (http://www.unhcr.org/551a70379.html).
74 Gall, L. (2015) “Dispatches: Stopping push backs at Bulgarian border”, Human Rights Watch, 31 March, 2015.
(https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/31/dispatches-stopping-pushbacks-bulgarias-border).
75 Gall, L. (2015) “Dispatches: Stopping push backs at Bulgarian border”, Human Rights Watch, 31 March, 2015.
(https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/31/dispatches-stopping-pushbacks-bulgarias-border).
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evidence found of actual construction. After a year, in March 2017 it was announced that
“Bulgaria would extend the current 3.5-metre-high, 30 km long border fence with Turkey to
cover the whole 240 km line separating the two countries [Bulgaria/Turkey].”76 Bulgarian
officials reported to the media that one of the main justification behind these developments
was the fences set up by the neighbouring countries:
Officials have also highlighted their concerns that the closing of the Greece-Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia border might also force migrants to enter western Europe through
Bulgaria.77
This is a symptom of the domino effect created by separate Member States taking actions at
their external borders. The lessons were not learnt from the 2012-2014 fences affair in this
area. Ironically, at that time Greece was initiating the fence, whereas now it looks like non-
Schengen countries are surrounding Greece with fences (FYROM and Bulgarian threats).
Lessons not learnt: Greece vs. Turkey, 2012 and Bulgaria vs. Turkey, 2014
In 2012, Greece erected a fence at the border with Turkey, in light of the Syrian crisis. The
fence stretched for 12 km, adding a barrier to the Eyros River and aimed to prevent or divert
migratory flows. As a reaction, in 2013 Bulgaria also started to build a fence with Turkey. This
was openly admitted by Gil Arias Fernández, who at the time was the deputy executive
director of Frontex. He stated that “[t]he result [of building fence in Greece] was that flow
changed towards the Bulgarian border”.78 The fence was completed in 2014. It was aimed at
demonstrating that Bulgaria is ready to protect its external borders and therefore entitled to
join the Schengen Area.79
Baltic States & Norway vs. Russia: The unexpected fences in the North-
East of Europe
In January 2017 three Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, also started to build fences,
though their major concern was related to ‘security threats’ from eastern neighbours, namely
Russia. For example, Lithuania has announced that it will build a 130 km-long fence along the
Kaliningrad strip (part of Russian Federation, which lies between Poland and Lithuania). The
Lithuanian foreign minister said that the EU will partly cover the expenses for this fence, which
will be partly made from bricks and partly from wire razor. 80 Whereas the official reason is
“stop[ping] the smuggling — of goods and people — organised on the Russian side” it seems
to be driven more by security and geopolitical concerns. 81
The Latvians and Estonians cited both concerns of security and also of stopping migrants and
refugees coming from the east. In both cases, it appears that the EU will also be contributing
financially to these plans. The EU will provide around EUR 100 million for the Baltic states to
build 200 km of ‘progressive fences’ that will “include holes and gaps for animals to go back
and forth in their natural habitat”.82 There is well-established evidence, including that
gathered by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), on how the border fences reduce the
76 Global Security (2017) “Border Fence with Turkey”, 26 March, 2017. (https://www.globalsecurity. org/military/
world/europe/bg-border-fence.htm).
77 Oliphant, V. (2016) “Bulgaria builds 30km fence on Turkish border to keep migrants out”, Express.co.uk,
11 August, 2016. (https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/698963/Bulgaria-migrant-crisis-30-kilometre-fence-
Greece-Turkey).
78 Lyman, R. (2015) “Bulgaria Puts Up a New Wall, but This One Keeps People Out”, April 5, 2015,
(https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/world/europe/bulgaria-puts-up-a-new-wall-but-this-one-keeps-people-
out.html#).
79 Lyman, R. (2015) “Bulgaria Puts Up a New Wall, but This One Keeps People Out”, April 5, 2015,
(https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/world/europe/bulgaria-puts-up-a-new-wall-but-this-one-keeps-people-
out.html#).
80 Day M.(2017) Lithuania to build fence along its border with Russia to protect itself from 'provocations', , Telegraph
UK, Warsaw , 17 January 2017.(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/17/lithuania-build-fence-along-border-
russia-protect-provocations/) .
81 Murray, D. (2017) “Lesser-known walls: How Trump's presidency is intensifying fear in the Baltics”, CBC News
January 29, 2017 (http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/baltics-nato-trump-walls-1.3956504).
82 Murray, D. (2017) “Lesser-known walls: How Trump's presidency is intensifying fear in the Baltics”, CBC News
January 29, 2017 (http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/baltics-nato-trump-walls-1.3956504).
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chances to submit asylum claims and increase the risks of refoulement.83 Thus, it seems that
public concern is more focused on the possible harm to the habitat of wild animals than that
of human beings.
The least-known border fence lies between Norway and Russia. In September 2016 Norwegian
authorities started building this fence with an aim of preventing “migrant smuggling and
irregular crossings of people from Syria” via Russia. The barrier is located at the Storskog
border crossing. It is built of steel, is 200 m long and 3.7 m high. The fence includes a gate
for road traffic, built in such a way that people cannot walk through it when it is closed.84
4.2. Strasbourg Court: Human Rights Standards at the External EU
border fences
The first of the EU’s external border fences was built by Spain. In 2017, it was finally
scrutinised by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The Strasbourg Court specifically
focused on the assessment of the implication of these fences on the fundamental rights of
potential asylum seekers. The fence was gradually constructed in the period from 2000 until
2005 with the aim of preventing arrivals of asylum seekers and migrants via Ceuta and Melilla
(see Figure 4 below). The physical fence was enhanced with a surveillance system – radars,
infrared cameras and video cameras that can detect not only people crossing, but also boats
from a 10-15 km distance. By 2005, all the Strait of Gibraltar was accompanied with the so-
called ‘Integrated System of External Vigilance’ (SIVE), which cost Spain approximately EUR
150 million.85
The effects of building such a tech-enhanced multi-layered fence was merely to divert
refugees and migrants towards the Canary Islands. This diversion of routes led to what is
often referred to as the ‘cayucos crisis’ in 2006. 86 This ‘crisis’ caused a shift in Spanish and
EU border management efforts, which were redirected to addressing the situation in the
Canary Islands, through the establishment of a joint operational cooperation with FRONTEX
agency and the development of bilateral cooperation with countries of transit and
destination.87
83 FRA (2016) “Guidance on how to reduce the risk of refoulement in external border management when working in
or together with third countries”, Paper, December 2016. (http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2016/scope-principle-
non-refoulement-contemporary-border-management-evolving-areas-law).
84 Reuters (2016) „Norway Will Build a Fence at Its Arctic Border With Russia” 24 August, 2016.
(https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/europe/russia-norway-border-fence-refugees.html).
85 Carling, J. (2007) “The Merits and Limitations of Spain's High-Tech Border Control“, 7 June 2007, MPI.
(https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/merits-and-limitations-spains-high-tech-border-control).
86 Godenau D. & A. Lopez Sala (2016) “Multi-layered migration deterrence and technology in Spanish maritime border
management”, Journal of Border Studies 31 (2), 151 – 169.
87 Carrera S. et al. (2018 forthcoming) “Does Offshoring Asylum and Migration Actually Work? A Comparative
Assessment of International Experiences and Their Effectiveness”, CEPS, 2018.
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Figure 4. Map of border fences in Ceuta & Melilla
Source: UNHCR (2017) Border fences and internal border controls in Europe,
March 2017. (https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/55249).
In 2009 the fences in Ceuta and Melilla were heightened up to 6 meters so as to prevent
climbing.88 At this stage the fence was once again enhanced with infra-red cameras, tear gas
canisters, noise and movement sensors and control towers as well as technology to prevent
the putting up of ladders.89
This border fence has been heavily criticised by national and international human rights,
humanitarian and faith-based organisations, not least as a waste of money and resources but
also because of its profound human rights implications.90 For example, in 2014 14 people died
while trying to reach the coast of Melilla just meters before the coast, while the Border Guards
from the other side of the fence shot rubber bullets.91 In addition, Spain has created a peculiar
‘operational border regime’, where persons in between the borders or climbing them were not
regarded as being in the Spanish territory, the so-called ‘non-places’. 92 In 2015 Spain
amended its Law on Protection of Public Safety (“Ley de protección de la seguridad
ciudadana”) to ‘legalise’ summary returns at the borders and this legislation was brought
before the national Constitutional Court.93
The Spanish fence case was brought before the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg which made a judgement on case N.D. and N.T. v Spain in October 2017. The
Strasbourg court found that the Spanish practices of ‘summary returns’ were violating the
88 Lopez Sala, A. (2015), “Exploring dissuasion as a (geo)political instrument in irregular migration control at the
Southern Spanish maritime border”, Geopolitics, 20 (3), 513 -534.
89 BBC (2009) „World's barriers: Ceuta and Melilla”, 5 November 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/africa
/8342923.stm.
90 Carling, J. (2007) “The Merits and Limitations of Spain's High-Tech Border Control“, 7 June 2007, MPI.
(https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/merits-and-limitations-spains-high-tech-border-control).
91 AI (2015) „Spain Morocco – a tragedy at the border“, 6 February 2015. https://www.amnesty.
org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/02/spain-morocco-a-tragedy-at-the-border/
92 Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and J. Vedsted-Hansen (2016), op. cit.
93 Gortázar Rotaeche, C & N. Ferré Trad (2017) „A cold shower for Spain-hot returns from Melilla to Morocco: N.D.
and N.T. v Spain ECtHR, 3 October 2017”, European Migration Law Blog, 20 October  2017,
(http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-cold-shower-for-spain-hot-returns-from-melilla-to-morocco-n-d-and-n-t-v-spain-
ecthr-3-october-2017/)
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prohibition of collective expulsions (Article 4 of Protocol 4), and that no effective remedies
were granted to individuals expelled (Article 13).94 The ECHR reiterated the principles
enunciated in the Khlaifia v. Italy judgement, according to which unless there is “a reasonable
and objective examination of each individual case” the state’s actions are considered as a
forced return of a group of aliens amounting to collective expulsion.95 The Court, reacting to
the Spanish Government’s justifications, also recalled the Hirsi Jamaa v Italy judgement,
where it said that “problems with managing migratory flows cannot justify having recourse to
practices which are not compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention”. The
case will later be heard before the ECHR’s Grand Chamber, as the Spanish Government has
requested a referral.96
This judgement will be important to evaluate the legality of the current practices of a number
of EU Member States that have recently resorted to erecting border walls and creating peculiar
border walled regimes that de facto and even de jure prevent persons from accessing asylum
in the EU in line with EU asylum acquis. For example, the European Center for Constitutional
and Human Rights has been taking a legal action on the similar practices of push-backs in
Idomeni (at the Greek-Macedonian border) as well as in so-called hotspots in Greece.97
In the case N.D. and N.T. v Spain, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that
Spanish ‘operational border’ practices of returning all refugees and migrants at the external
borders with Morocco in Melilla undermined the right of third-country nationals to submit
asylum claims and ultimately amount to collective expulsions that are prohibited under the
European Convention of Human Rights. It would be thus interesting if the European Court of
Justice in Luxembourg would clarify the (in)compatibility of such practices with the right to
seek asylum as enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as with the
Schengen Borders Code, as the principle of non-refoulement is explicitly mentioned in Article
14 of the SBC.
94 N.D. and N.T. v Spain ECtHR, n (applications nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15), 3 October 2017.
95 Khlaifia v. Italy, No. 16483/12, ECtHR 2016, at par. 237 and in N. D and N.T at par. 98.
96 ECtHR (2018) Grand Chamber Panel’s decisions - January 2018, Press Release - Referrals to Grand Chamber ,
30/01/2018 (https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["003-5990165-7667371"]} )
97 ECCHR (2017) “ECtHR judgment on case of N.D. and N.T. vs Spain
Expulsions conducted by Spain at the EU’s external borders violate the European Convention on Human
Rights”, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/international-crimes-and-accountability/migration/melilla.html.
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5. LATEST POLICY DEVELOPMENTS: THE NEW COMMISSION
PROPOSAL ON TEMPORARY REINTRODUCTION OF
INTERNAL BORDERS
The rules for reintroducing internal border controls are laid down in Chapter II of the SBC
(Articles 25 to 35). The specific periods and deadlines granted to EU Member States
to temporarily introduce border controls, as well as the criteria and reporting
procedures applicable to each of these measures are essential elements of Chapter
II of the SBC. Under the current regime the following time schedule applies.
The general framework is laid down in Article 25 SBC, which stipulates that “[w]here, in the
area without internal border control, there is a serious threat to public policy or internal
security in a Member State”, border controls may be introduced “as a last resort” for a limited
period of up to 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration
exceeds 30 days. If “the threat” continues to exist, the same Article foresees that border
control at the internal borders can be prolonged for renewable periods of up to 30 days each,
which in total may not exceed 6 months. The procedure for re-introducing internal border
checks is laid down in Article 27 SBC, which states the main criteria:
1. Notification to other Member States and the European Commission, and submission at the
same time to the Council and the European Parliament, at the latest four weeks before the
planned reintroduction, or within a shorter period;
2. Provision of the following information by the relevant Member State:
 The reasons, including all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a
serious threat to its public policy or internal security;
 The scope, specifying the specific parts of its territory where controls will be
applied;
 The names of the authorised crossing points;
 The date and duration of the action; and
 Where appropriate, the measures to be adopted by other Member States.
Article 29 SBC currently envisages a specific procedure “where exceptional circumstances put
the overall functioning of the area without internal border control at risk”. Article 29.1 SBC
clarifies that these “exceptional circumstances” will need to be proportional to the threat to
the overall functioning of the Schengen area “as a result of persistent serious deficiencies
relating to external border control”, insofar as “those circumstances constitute a serious threat
to public policy or internal security”. In these circumstances, this provision allows Member
States to prolong internal border controls for “for a period of up to six months…[which] may
be prolonged, no more than three times, for a further period of up to six months if the
exceptional circumstances persist.”
On 27 September 2017, the European Commission has put forward a new Proposal
amending the Regulation 2016/399 as regards the rules applicable to the temporary
reintroduction of border controls at internal borders.98 It is not entirely clear to what
extent the revision of the SBC was actually necessary or what its added value is in
light of the current Schengen rules. The proposal would significantly amend the SBC by
prolonging the above-mentioned existing time-frame permitting Member States to
reintroduce internal border checks before reaching the application/threshold of the
‘emergency option’ envisaged Article 29 SBC as follows:
First, the proposed revision of Article 25 SBC would allow individual Member States to
introduce and prolong internal border controls for a total period of up to one year (as opposed
98 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the rules
applicable to the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders, COM52017) 571 final, 27.9.2017,
Brussels.
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to a total period of up to six months under the current SBC). Furthermore, a new Article 25.4
states that in exceptional circumstances envisaged in a new version of Article 27a SBC, the
total period of internal border controls can be extended by “a maximum length of two years”.
In cases where there are “exceptional circumstances” envisaged in Article 29 SBC, then the
total period would be prolonged by a further two–year period.
Second, the proposed revision of Article 27 SBC includes an additional procedural criterion
to the list of requirements to be submitted by the Member State reintroducing internal border
checks, namely a “risk assessment” assessing “how long the identified threat is expected
to persist and which sections of the internal borders are affected”, demonstrating that it is a
last resort measure. Where the border control has already been reintroduced for more than
6 months, this risk assessment “shall also explain how the previous reintroduction has
contributed to remedying the identified threat”. The proposed revision to Article 27 SBC
emphasises that the Risk Assessment shall also include information on prior coordination
between relevant Member States and that it be transmitted to the European Border and Coast
Guard Agency (Frontex).
The proposed revision of Article 27 SBC would also allow the Commission to request additional
information from the state concerned, including information needed to assess whether this is
a last resort measure. Special emphasis is therefore given to adequately ensuring the
“last resort” test”. The Proposal also includes an obligation for the European Commission
to issue an opinion following the notification if it is not convinced of the proportionality or
necessity of the measure. Moreover, the Commission will also issue an opinion if the controls
have been already running for six months. The proposal also includes a more developed
and formalised ‘consultation’ procedure, which may include ‘joint meetings’ between the
state reintroducing border checks, the affected Member State(s) and the Commission. The
Commission’s proposal states that “[t]he proportionality of the intended measures, the
identified threat to public policy or internal security as well as the ways of ensuring
implementation of mutual cooperation shall be examined”. Moreover, the state planning to
reintroduce controls “shall take the utmost account of the results of such consultation when
carrying out border controls”.
From the preceding analysis, it is clear that the risk assessment to be included in accordance
with the proposed Article 27 SBC will be drafted by the state introducing internal border
checks. It is not clear what a “risk assessment” precisely entails, nor is it clear what the main
components comprising such an assessment are. It is problematic to put the functioning
of the Schengen area in hands of a preventive logic based on “perceived risks”,
instead of robust and solid evidence of the actual existence of any threat or
challenge. Moreover, the assessment should have been closely linked to the Schengen
Evaluation Mechanism. It is clear that it should not be up to the Member State concerned to
unilaterally assess what the situation or “risk” on the ground is to justify the proportionality
and necessity of internal border checks.
Article 4.1 of Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 stipulates that the Schengen Evaluation
Mechanism covers “all aspects of the Schengen acquis, including the absence of border
control at internal borders”. Article 4.2 emphasises that “[e]valuations may consist of
questionnaires and of on-site visits which may be announced or unannounced. Announced
on-site visits shall be preceded by a questionnaire. The on-site visits and questionnaires may,
where appropriate, be used either independently or in combination in evaluating specific
Member States and/or specific areas”. Article 13 of the same Regulation establishes that
unannounced on-site visits to the internal borders “shall take place without prior
notification to the Member State(s) concerned. General guidelines on practical arrangements
for such visits shall be established by the Commission in close cooperation with the Member
States”.
The evaluation of reintroducing internal border checks in light of the Schengen Evaluation
Mechanism’s standards should be developed further and should be put into practice in addition
to the risk assessment exercise. Whenever a state willing to introduce or reintroduce internal
border checks issues a Risk Assessment, this should be tied to a formalised
operationalisation of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism. The General Guidelines on
practical arrangements for such visits should equally be amended and linked to the new phase
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of the procedure envisaged in Article 27a SCB. Furthermore, when the “threat” relates to the
argument of “secondary movements”, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), and its
currently discussed transformation into a new EU Asylum Agency, should be operationalised
on the ground to support the Member States concerned with the optimisation and soundness
of its national asylum systems.
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6. A NEW EUROPEAN INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT
(EIBM) CONCEPT
The European Integrated Border Management (EIBM) concept has also been part of the
strategy that the EU has elaborated “to compensate” for the abolition of internal borders
within the Schengen area. This concept is based on the assumption that strengthened
operational and technical cooperation at the EU external borders is necessary for both
facilitating the legitimate movement of goods and persons and for the detection, prevention
and reduction of irregular migration and cross-border crime.99
Originally a political objective,100 the integration of border management at the European
level is now expressly foreseen in EU primary law after the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Article 77(2)(d) of the TFEU includes the progressive introduction of
a European IBM system among the goals to be achieved by the EU policies on borders checks,
asylum and migration. The integrated management of EU external borders has been a
multi-dimensional concept which has served many interests.101
At the normative level, it has entailed the development and implementation of common rules
for the conduction of EU external borders checks, surveillance activities and return operations.
In addition to the adoption of legislative and policy measures, the EIBM model has also served
for the development of EU ”risk analysis”, as well as the establishment of supranational
systems for border surveillance (e.g. EUROSUR)102 and information exchange (e.g. the
Second Generation Schengen Information System,103 the Visa Information System,104
Eurodac,105 and the recently introduced Entry-Exit System)106.
At the operational level, the creation of a European IBM system has relied on the development
of a framework for coordination which applies to all relevant authorities and agencies involved
in the performance of border security and immigration management functions in the scope of
the Schengen system.107 Under the EIBM regime, national authorities are not only meant to
cooperate among themselves, but also with relevant EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies
(e.g. Frontex, Europol and Eurojust, and EU-Lisa), as well as with the authorities of third
countries. The active involvement of neighbouring countries, as well as the adoption of
99 Wolff, S. (2010), EU Integrated Border Management beyond Lisbon: Contrasting Policies and Practices, Clingendael
European Studies Programme (CESP), p. 23-24.
100 European Council Presidency Conclusions, Laeken 14-15.12.2001.
101 Council Conclusions on Integrated Border Management, 2768th Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting,
Brussels, 4-5.12.2006.
102 Regulation (EU) No. 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing
the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), OJ L 295, 6.10.2013.
103 Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 regarding
access to the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) by the services in the Member States
responsible for issuing vehicle registration certificates.
104 Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 concerning the Visa
Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas (VIS Regulation).
105 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment
of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and
on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for
law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the
operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice
106 Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an
Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing
the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement
purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008
and (EU) No 1077/2011.
107 European Commission (2010), Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in EC External Cooperation, p. 27-
33.
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“measures in third countries” represent a central element of the so-called “four-tier access
control model” which underpins the European IBM concept.108
The implementation and future development of the European IBM concept falls
under the “shared responsibility or competences” between EU and Member States’
actors. It must be go hand-to-hand with Lisbon Treaty standards, secondary
(Schengen-related) legislation –chiefly the SBC - and the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights. While this variety of actors belong to profoundly different administrative structures,
and respond to specific institutional mandates, they have been functionally co-opted into the
same multi-pronged EU border security framework. At the same time, and until recently, no
clear normative indications have been provided at the EU level as to the exact ways in which
executive powers, operational competences and related responsibilities were meant to be
implemented and shared in practice between the EU agencies, Member States and third
countries’ authorities responsible for the implementation of the EIBM concept.109 This has now
changed with the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard.
6.1. Enacting the EIBM? The European Border and Coast Guard
The first EU legislative attempt at enacting the EIBM was made with the adoption of Regulation
EU/1624/2016, which renamed the EU agency Frontex as the European Border and Coast
Guard (EBCG).110 This new piece of EU legislation describes the integrated management of
EU external borders as a “fundamental component” of the Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice (AFSJ), and entrusts the EBCG with an enhanced operational mandate which touches
upon all the main components of the EIBM concept.111
In the first place, the EBCG Regulation has expanded Frontex’s operational tasks related to
border controls and border surveillance. In the field of expulsion, the agency has been given
the competence to implement joint return flights.112 The EBCG is authorised to conduct these
functions both within the EU and in cooperation with non-EU countries. Since the adoption of
the EBCG regulation, the Agency can in fact carry out joint operations on the territory of, and
in collaboration with, third countries which are neighbouring at least one EU Member State.113
The deployment of Frontex Liaison Officers is also instrumental to the EIBM strategy, as it
aims at strengthening cooperation (including on return matters) among Member States and
with third countries “of origin or transit regarding illegal immigration”.114 Lastly, the Agency
is required to perform “vulnerability assessments” on the basis of which weaknesses of the
EU border protection system are meant to be identified, and “mitigation measures”
adopted.115
Besides consolidating and expanding Frontex’s in-the-field involvement in all the domains
composing the European IBM concept, the new EBCG Regulation has also conferred the
agency with the responsibility of designing the operational strategy and managing the
technical infrastructure required for implementation. In fact, under the current normative
framework, the EBCG Management Board116 - which acts on the basis of a proposal by the
agency’s Executive Director - is to provide for the strategic planning of the EIBM
108 According to the definition provided by the 2006 Council Conclusions, the so-called EIBM “four-tier access model”
covers: common visa policy, measures with neighbouring Third Countries, border control measures at the external
border as well as risk analysis measures within the Schengen area, and return).
109 Ferraro, F., De Capitani, E., (2016), The new European Border and Coast Guard: yet another “half way” EU
reform?, ERA Academy of European Law, Springer Online, 8 December 2016.
110 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European
Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and
repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No
2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, OJ L 251, 16.09.2016.
111 Recital 2 of the ECBG Regulation.
112 Article 8 of the EBCG Regulation.
113 Article 54 of the EBCG Regulation.
114 Articles 12 and 55 of the EBCG Regulation.
115 Articles 12(8) and 19 of the EBCG Regulation.
116 The EBCG Management Board is composed of one Representatives per EU Member State, and two representatives
of the Commission. Article of the EBCG.
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implementation ”taking into account, where justified, the specific situation of the Member
States, in particular their geographical location”.117
In substance, with the introduction of the EBCG Regulation Frontex has become responsible
for bridging the different elements/dimensions of the European Integrated Border
Management and return system. Frontex involvement in the establishment of the EIBM is in
fact both cross-border and cross-sectorial. It entails the performance, coordination, support
and monitoring of border control, border surveillance and return operations, but it also covers
the implementation of “solidarity mechanisms” provided by EU funding instruments (e.g.
under the “North African window” of the EU Trust Fund for Africa), as well as the use of state-
of-the-art technology including large-scale information systems.118 Under the EIBM strategic
framework, Frontex is required to develop and maintain closer cooperation links with other
security structures, including not only other EU JHA agencies (e.g. Europol and Eurojust), but
also with military operations such as EUBAM Libya,119 the (recently extended) EUNAVFOR
MED,120 and other EU foreign affairs and defence initiatives, as confirmed by the Agency’s
Work Programme for the period 2018-2020.121
The role entrusted to EBCG in ensuring the effective implementation of the EIBM is in line
with the wider process of ‘agencification of the AFSJ’,122 and in particular with the progressive
‘empowerment’ of EU JHA agencies as strategic players in the migration management field.123
Formally, the involvement of Frontex in the design and implementation of the EIBM system
responds to the objective of overcoming “the discrepancies that still remain at the national
level”.124 The increase of the agency’s competences, human resources, financial endowments,
and technical assets is thus justified as necessary and instrumental to the creation of “an
interoperable and unified strategic framework for European Integrated Border
Management”.125
At the same time, by placing Frontex at the core of a system that functions on the basis of
“threat assessments”, “rapid border interventions”, externalisation and (to some extent)
militarisation of border controls and intelligence-led policing,126 the EIBM concept assumes
a meaning that clearly prioritises the securitisation of borders over the objective of
ensuring a “proper functioning of cross-border transport” and access to
international protection. In this regard, it is worth noting that in the provision of the EBCG
regulation listing the EIBM components, no reference is made to the integration of customs
policy, despite the fact that the latter constitutes an essential aspect of border
management.127
However, the actual integration of profoundly different (national, regional, and supranational)
border security structures under the strategic coordination of Frontex remains problematic.
In the first place, serious structural and domestically-embedded shortcomings affect the
117 Article 3 EBCG Regulation.
118 Article 4 of the EBCG Regulation.
119 Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP of 22 May 2013 on the European Union Integrated Border Management
Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), OJ L138/15, 24.5.2013.
120 Council Decision 2017/1385 /CFSP of 25 July 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union
military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA), OJ L194/61.
121 See, Frontex Programming Document 2018-2020, 19 January 2017.
122 Curtin, D., Delegation to EU-non-majoritarian agencies and emerging practices of public accountability, in
Gerardin, D., Munoz, R., Petit, N. (eds.) Regulation through agencies in the EU. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, p.
87-111.
123 Scipioni, M. (2017), De novo bodies and EU integration: What is the story behind EU agencies’ expansion?, Journal
of Common Market Studies, pp. 1-17.
124 European Commission, COM(2015) 671 final, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No
863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, Strasbourg, 15.12.2015.
125 European Commission, COM(2017) 219 final, Third Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
European Council and the Council on the operationalisation of the European Border and Coast Guard, Brussels,
2.5.2017.
126 Campesi, G. (2014), Frontex, the Euro-Mediterranean border and the paradoxes of humanitarian rhetoric, South-
East European Journal of Political Science, Vol. II, No. 3, 2014, pp. 126-134.
127 See supra note 17.
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agency’s capacity to effectively ‘centralise’ or ‘integrate’ border management functions as
expected by the EIBM concept.
In fact, under the EBCG regulation Member States still maintain the “primary
responsibility” for the management of their external borders. In practice, this means
that national operational initiatives (including military operations with law enforcement
purposes) can still be adopted by individual Member States, but also between them and in
cooperation with third countries. The only limitation is the “compatibility” of such initiatives
with the actions of Frontex. The effective ‘integration’ of the EBCG activities with national
coast guard authorities remains equally to be seen. Moreover, the agency’s ”right to
intervene” remains subject to a decision of the Council, which retains the power to approve
the measures to be implemented by Frontex in cases where ”urgent action” is needed in EU
Member States facing profound deficiencies that could jeopardise the functioning of the
Schengen area.128
Therefore, while Frontex is conferred with increased human capacity and financial resources,
the EIBM system as defined under its current mandate does not seem to replace the
old intergovernmental and disintegrated model of border control and
surveillance.129 Importantly, however, the fact that the IBM concept has been
‘Lisbonised’ and is now enshrined in the EU Treaties means that the ways in which
the EBCG will implement the various IBM components must take due regard for the
EU borders and asylum acquis, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
6.2. Fragmentation of accountability regimes
Current EU attempts at supranationalising border and migration management under the
umbrella of the EIBM also blur the accountability regimes applying to the different domestic
and/or EU law enforcement (border and/or police) authorities and security actors involved in
the establishment of the EIBM system in light of EU Treaty and legal standards. In particular,
the EBCG Regulation does not provide for clear rules on allocation and
implementation of accountability in the implementation of the EIBM, in particular
regarding multi-actor situations.
Uncertainty as to the type of judicial and administrative remedies available arises, in the first
place, in cases of the fundamental rights abuses that might be committed in the framework
of Frontex joint operations. The different agents composing the Frontex “operational teams”
are responsible for acting in line with the legal obligations provided in primary and secondary
law provisions, and remain subject to the ethical and behavioural principles set forth in the
Frontex Code of Conduct.130 However, it is incumbent upon the home Member States’
authorities from which the different agents are sent to exercise control over their deployed
personnel. For example, in Frontex’s Joint Operation European Patrols Network (EPN) Hera
the national officials responsible for the maritime and aerial assets deployed at sea acted
under the “command and control” of their respective home country.131
Article 21(5) of the ECBG Regulation explicitly stresses that it is incumbent upon individual
countries to provide “appropriate disciplinary or other measures” which, in accordance with
national law, should apply to violations of fundamental rights or international protection
obligations committed by their border guards. Article 21(2) of the Frontex Code of Conduct
further specifies that it is up to the “relevant authority of the Member State to use its powers
regarding the necessary disciplinary measures and, if applicable, suspend or remove the
128 Ibid., p. 46.
129 Carrera, S., Blockmans, S., Cassarino J.P., Gros D., Guild, E. (2016), The European Border and Coast Guard
Addressing migration and asylum challenges in the Mediterranean? CEPS Task Force Report.
130 The Code of Conduct applies to all Frontex operational activities, including those which take place outside the
territory of the Union and, to all persons participating in them (Article 1).
131 See, Frontex Operational Plan Joint Operation EPN Hera 2014, 2014/SBS/03.
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person concerned from the respective pool for a defined period”.132 On the other hand, Article
43 of the EBCG Regulation establishes that, with regard to any criminal offences, members
of the Frontex team shall be treated in the same ways as officials of the Member State hosting
the joint operation.
Members of Frontex’s own staff are also subject to an accountability regime which
is distinct from those that apply to the border and coast guards deployed by the
national (EU or third-country) authorities involved in a particular joint operation. In
fact, Frontex agents are only responsible for their actions or omissions before their Executive
Director, based on the information received by the agency through its coordinating officers,133
the serious incident reporting system134 or in light of the allegations brought to the agency
through the complaint mechanisms established under Article 72 of the EBCG Regulation. The
power to activate disciplinary measures and potentially to suspend or terminate the relevant
joint operation (in cases where violations of fundamental rights are of a serious nature or
likely to persist) is thus exclusively based on an internal assessment conducted within the
agency.135
The complaint mechanism established under the EBCG Regulation is therefore
affected by a structural lack of impartiality and transparency. In fact, complaints
against Frontex officials are only handled internally within the agency, leaving the decision to
the Frontex Executive Director. On the other hand, complaints against national officials rely
on the existence of national complaint mechanisms and leave the different domestic
authorities a large margin of discretion as to whether and how to follow up complaints received
by the agency’s Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) through the Frontex complaint mechanism.
This prevents the mechanism established under article 72 of the EBCG regulation to meet the
standards required for a remedy to as effective in the meaning of the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights.136
Furthermore, the EBCG regulation does not provide for a system of systematic and
independent monitoring capable of ensuring that the legal and behavioral standards
provided in EU primary law (i.e. the EU Charter) and secondary legislation (e.g. the
Schengen Border Code, the Return Directive, etc.) are respected by the different authorities
involved in border control, border surveillance, and return operations. Not only is the presence
of independent return monitors not fully ensured in the different EU Member States,137 but no
obligation exists for the agency to appoint external monitors mandated to overview the
implementation of border controls and surveillance activities performed in remote and unsafe
contexts such as blue and green borders inside and outside states’ territories. This generates
substantial difficulties in effectively documenting and reporting abuses before
existing complaint bodies. It also hinders the collection of information and generating the
necessary evidence on the safety of EU external borders, especially from the perspective of
the fundamental rights of third-country nationals affected by the exercise of executive powers
which are often involved in the conduction of border controls, border surveillance and/or
return operations.
In substance, different accountability regimes (and related oversight systems)
apply to the border and coast guards that, on a case by case basis, participate in an
operational activity developed under the EIBM framework. The different types of
complaint procedures and remedies that are available to individuals affected by border
132 Article 21(2) of the EBCG Regulation further stresses that “Only if the continued engagement of this person
jeopardises the Frontex operational activity in question, the Executive Director may decide to suspend or remove
him or her from that activity”.
133 Article 22 of the EBC Regulation.
134 Article 16(3)h Article 25(4) of the EBCG Regulation.
135 Article 25(4) of the EBCG Regulation.
136 Carrera, S., Stefan, M. (2018), Complaint mechanisms for fundamental human rights violations in the context of
border management and joint expulsions operations, Issue Paper for the Office of the Council Of Europe’s Special
Representative for the Rights of Migrants (forthcoming).
137 See, Fundamental Rights Agency (2016), Forced return monitoring systems – State of play in 28 EU Member
States (updated 26/4/2016).
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control, border surveillance or return activities depend not only on the specific authority to
which the agent that adopted the action or decision leading to an abuse is affiliated to (e.g.
national police forces, coast guards, military, or civilians including doctors, private security
company, etc.), but also on the type of mission and/or framework of cooperation within which
the action or decision leading to a fundamental right infringement was adopted (e.g. Frontex
joint operation, CDSP mission, international cooperation falling outside EU law, etc.). Specific
accountability issues further arise from participation in the EIBM framework of military actors
(e.g. the Member States’ navies), and third-countries authorities.
6.3. Interlinking internal and external border surveillance actions
Under the EU IBM concept, the internal and external dimension of EU border
surveillance measures are becoming increasingly intertwined. This trend is reflected
in the ever-prominent contribution of defence actors in the development of the new EIBM
strategy, both in terms of direct operational interventions (executive functions) and support
provided to third countries in the field of border management (training, mentoring, and
monitoring functions).138
An example of operational involvement of EU Member States’ navies in the implementation
of the EIBM is provided by the Common Defence and Security Policy (CDSP) EUNAVFOR
MED Operation Sophia. Originally the military actors participating in this operation were
mainly mandated to fight against smugglers. However, the scope of the mission has been
recently expanded and now it formally involves IBM-related functions and in
particular surveillance activities, search and rescue operations at sea and
information exchange with Member States' law enforcement agencies, as well as
with Frontex and Europol.139 The fact that the EBCG and CDSP operational activities are
progressively overlapping is confirmed by a recent Commission report stating that the
apprehension of suspected smugglers and traffickers and the “neutralisation” of more than
497 assets involved in such activities constitutes a result obtained through the joint
deployment of naval unist from both EBCG Joint Operation Triton and Operation Sophia.140
The involvement of the military is thus increasingly seen as complementary to the activities
of the EBCG agency in the south Mediterranean and it is giving new possibilities for interaction
with other individual and bilateral initiatives of EU Member States (such as Italy).141 It has
become, in substance, a key component of the overall “toolbox of CSDP support” to the EIBM
concept. At the same time, it is important to note that authorities involved in CDSP
missions such as Operation Sophia are not subject to same norms, codes of conduct
and oversight (rule of law) mechanisms that apply to the authorities participating
in the implementation of the EBCG Regulation and EU primary and secondary
borders and asylum acquis. This means that victims of potential fundamental rights
violations occurring at the hands of the authorities involved in Operation Sophia are not
allowed to seek the same remedies to that would be available against abuses committed in
the framework of an EBCG operational activity.142
It is problematic that there has been an increasing demand for the CSDP to tackle border
management tasks throughout the last decade and that the principles of Integrated Border
Management (IBM) have been progressively incorporated into the strategic and operational
138 European Commission, COM(2017) 669 final Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
European Council and the Council Progress report on the European Agenda on Migration. Brussels, 15.11.2017.
139 See, Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1385 of 25 July 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European
Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA).
140 European Commission, COM(2017) 669 final, Report From The Commission To The European Parliament, The
European Council And The Council, Brussels, 15.11.2017.
Progress report on the European Agenda on Migration
141 See, Bevilacqua, G. (2017), Exploring the Ambiguity of Operation Sophia Between Military and Search and Rescue
Activities, in Andreone, G., The Future of the Law of the Sea: Bridging Gaps Between National, Individual and
Common Interests, Springer Open.
142 Carrera, S., Stefan, M. (2018), op. cit.
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processes for the planning and conduct of CSDP missions abroad.143 Several CDSP capacity
building operations have in particular been developed to prompt authorities of unstable
neighbouring countries into cooperating with Frontex. One of the components of the very
same Operation Sophia is in fact to conduct training for the Libyan coastguard’s personnel to
be deployed in patrol boat crews. The CDSP operation is thus integrating other initiatives
managed by the Commission and implemented by EU Member States such as the Seahorse
Programme, which focuses on increasing the capabilities of the Libyan Coast Guard and other
North African countries’ authorities “with a view to longer-term work to establish the so-called
“Seahorse Mediterranean Network”.144
Official documents expressly state that it is in the EU's own interest to help build the capacities
of third countries to control their own territory, manage flows of people and goods, and
address security challenges.145 However, by promoting the externalisation of border and
coast guard functions, the EIBM concept endorses a strategy of progressive
disengagement of the EU and Member States from human rights and rule of law-
sensitive activities such as search and rescue operations on the high seas. This is
also confirmed by the fact that, compared to the precedent EPN Triton operation, the newly
launched Frontex mission ‘Themis’ is operating further away from the Libyan territorial
waters.146 By conferring an increased operational role on third countries’ authorities,
the Union and the Member States seem to be attempting to escape the responsibility
that would apply for abuses over asylum seekers and immigrants committed under
their own jurisdiction, as provided by the European Court of Human Rights’
landmark judgment in Hirsi Jamaa.147
The exact role and actual responsibilities of foreign authorities acting de facto as
agents under the strategic framework of the EIBM remain to a large extent unclear.
This is also due to the fact that their missions are often covered by “soft law” instruments,
such as Council Decisions, declarations, working agreements, memoranda of understanding
and technical arrangements which, adopted outside the EU ordinary legislative decision-
making procedures, escape the democratic and judicial scrutiny which, in a post-Lisbon Treaty
framework, should apply to the EU measures and policies in the field of migration and border
management.148 At the same time, partial references in EU legislative texts such as the EBCG
Regulation alone cannot address the problems related to the identification of the authority
responsible for fundamental rights violations, nor solve the issue related to the uncertainty in
the accountability regimes applicable to the different actors involved in the EIBM
implementation.
6.4. Interlinking different large-scale databases for border
management and surveillance purposes
The progressive interconnection and ‘interoperability’ of existing EU large-scale
databases offers yet another example of the way in which the inter-agency and
cross-sectorial approach underlying the EIBM concept results in a “blurring of
boundaries”149 between different EU policies ranging from immigration to criminal justice
and police cooperation, and from foreign security policy to defence.
143 See the Joint Staff Working Paper, Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ road map implementation - Progress
report, Brussels, 24 September 2012.
144 Commission, Progress report on the European Agenda on Migration, COM/2017/0669 final, Brussels, 15.11.2017.
145 European Commission, COM(2016) 385 final Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the European Council, the Council and the European Investment Bank on establishing a new Partnership Framework
with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 7.6.2016.
146 Frontex, Frontex Launching New Operation in Central Med, 2018-01-31.
147 European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa and other v Italy, para. 81. See also ECtHR 3 October 2017, N.D.
and N.T. v Spain, Application nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, para. 54.
148 Carrera, S., Den Hertog, L., Stefan, M. (2017), It wasn’t me! The Luxembourg Court Orders on the EU-Turkey
Refugee Deal, CEPS Policy Insight No 2017-15, April 2017.
149 Mitsilegas, V. (2017) The EU Security Union as a Paradigm of Preventive Justice, in Carrera, S., Mitsilegas, V.,
Constitutionalising the Security Union: Effectiveness, rule of law and rights in countering terrorism and crime, CEPS
Paperback Series, Brussels, 2017, pp. 8-10.
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The achievement of ‘full-interoperability’ of EU information systems (e.g. SIS II, VIS,
Eurodac and the recently introduced EES) constitutes a key component of the EIBM
concept. It is also part of the priorities pursued by the EU security agenda.150 The
interoperability-based data exchange promoted under the EIBM concept is rooted in the
assumption that in order to effectively perform their functions EU Member States’ border
guards, law enforcement authorities, security actors and EU agencies as diverse as Frontex
and Europol need “fast and seamless access to all information” collected in various central
systems.151 As such, this mechanism entails not only the progressive interconnection of
information systems established for different purposes, but also full availability (i.e. maximum
collection and exchange) for national and European border guard, police authorities and
intelligence services of personal data stored in different databases, irrespective of the main
purposes for which these databases are established.
At the EU level, a series of legal and policy initiatives are currently under discussion to tackle
the fragmentation of existing information systems. Mainly, these initiatives aim at enhancing
border management and border security through the adoption of a series technical expedients
including, for instance: a single search interface, a biometric matching service, a common
repository of data and the development of interconnectivity between existing and proposed
EU IT systems, Europol and Interpol databases (e.g. Stolen and Lost Travel Documents, and
the Travel Documents Associated with Notices databases) and national IT systems.
By promoting the creation of “European wide integrated and modern border surveillance
systems” which include large-scale information systems such as the EES, SIS II, VIS,
EURODAC, INTERPOL and EUROPOL,152 the EIBM concept has become instrumental to a
model of border control and mobility surveillance which extends to all travellers,
including EU citizens. The exchange of different types of data among different actors under
the EIBM concept and the EU security strategy is leading towards a regime of generalised
surveillance of movement of persons across EU borders. This is confirmed, for example, by
the progressive expansion of the scope of SIS beyond the field of border checks,
and the consequent use of this system for the purpose of police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters.153
At the same time, interoperability of information systems raises serious questions, in
particular when it comes to access to databases such as SIS, VIS and Eurodac for purposes
related to internal security and anti-terrorism.154 These information systems were primarily
designed as instruments for border management and migration control. However, the use of
the information contained therein by law enforcement and security authorities
poses significant challenges to fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter, and
in particular to the right to privacy, data protection, and non-discrimination.155 Also,
as stressed by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in a recent publication on interoperability
and EU information systems, the principles of data minimisation, purpose limitation and
storage limitation ”may be subject to new fundamental rights challenges” when IT systems
become interoperable.156
One of the main challenges deriving from the EU’s current efforts at progressively
interconnecting existing and proposed large-scale databases is the overall lack of
transparency regarding the exact distribution of tasks, access rights and conditions
150 Commission, The European Agenda on Security, COM(2015) 158 final, Strasbourg, 28.04.2015.
151 Commission, Inception Impact Assessment on Interoperability of information systems for migration and security,
December 2017.
152 Commission’s presentation on European Integrated Border Management : 11 STRATEGIC COMPONENTS, prepared
for the Meeting of the Expert Group "Management of the External Borders", Brussels, 19-20.06.2017
153 European Parliament Research Service, Revision of the Schengen Information System for law enforcement,
briefing February 2018.
154 Curtin, D. (2017), “Security of the interstice and interoperable data sharing: A first cut”, in: S. Carrera and V.
Mitsilegas (eds.), Constitutionalising the Security Union: Effectiveness, rule of law and rights in countering terrorism
and crime, Brussels: CEPS, pp.67-68.
155 Vavoula, N. (2017), Immigration and Privacy in the Law of the European Union: The Case od Databases, PhD
Thesis, Queen Mary University of London.
156 FRA (2017) Fundamental rights and the interoperability of EU information systems: borders and security.
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for sharing information among the different authorities responsible for managing
the system (the so-called end users).
In fact, each of the legislative acts establishing individual databases entrust upon different
authorities the responsibility to act as controller and contain specific provisions regulating
access the data, purposes of processing, storage periods and modalities related to data-
sharing with third countries. Against this backdrop, it becomes increasingly difficult for the
subject whose data (including biometrics) is collected, stored, exchanged and used through
interoperable IT systems, to verify the legitimacy of these activities. As a consequence, while
interoperability increases the risk of mistakes, unlawful access or misuse of personal
information,157 the individuals’ right to good administration and effective remedy in
case of abuses is jeopardised by the unclear definition of the operational and
oversight responsibilities under the existing EU data management architecture. In a
context of increased interoperability, different bodies become responsible for data protection
obligations in respect to data contained in different IT systems but pertaining to the same
person. This further blurring of roles and responsibility not only has negative repercussions
on the data subject’s right to an effective remedy, but is also likely to undermine trust among
the different authorities responsible for handling and processing the information.
Collection of travellers’ information at the border amounts, de facto and de jure, to a border
check. The authorities performing such functions remain therefore subject to the fundamental
rights standards and obligations deriving from EU primary and secondary law provisions. This
means that EU Member States’ authorities performing border control and
surveillance functions through the use of large scale information systems are under
the obligation to respect the Schengen Border Code’s provision requiring that
measures undertaken in the context of these activities fully respects human dignity,
are proportionate to the objectives pursued and do not discriminate on grounds of
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.158
6.5. The revised EU Smart Border Package
The Smart Border Package is also a “part of the continuous development of the Integrated
Border Management Strategy”. It refers to an EU initiative aimed at complementing the
existing EU large scale information systems established for the collection and management of
borders, migration and asylum-related data.159
The official aim of the Smart Border Package is to “fill the information gaps” that
the three large-scale databases already developed by the EU (i.e. SIS, VIS and
Eurodac) left in areas related to the management of external borders, reduction of
overstays of irregular migration and the fight against terrorism and serious crime.160
The main shortcomings to be addressed by the revised version of the “Package” proposed by
the Commission in 2016 include:
 The insufficient quality and speed of border controls involving third-country nationals;
 The impossibility under the current system to ensure a systematic and reliable
monitoring of third-country nationals’ stay within the Schengen area; as well as
 The difficulty related to the identification of third-country nationals in case they destroy
their official documentation after entering the Schengen area.
157 Ibid, pp 25-28.
158 See Article 7 SBC.
159 European Commission, Revised Proposal for (a) regulation(s) establishing an EU Smart Border System, Inception
Impact Assessment, Brussels, June 2015.
160 European Commission, Statement Security Union: Commission welcomes adoption of Entry/Exit System for
stronger and smarter EU borders, Brussels, 25.10.
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Compared to the original 2013 proposal,161 the 2016 version of EU Smart Borders
presents a wider scope. In fact, it is not only limited to the border management-related
objectives of reducing waiting time at border checks, improving the quality of identity checks,
and gathering more accurate information related to so-called “overstayers”. It now also serves
a new purpose, namely law enforcement access and use of travellers’ data gathered during
border controls. With a view to achieving these objectives, EU regulations have recently been
adopted to establish an Entry/Exit System (EES) and amend the Schengen Border Code
accordingly.162 In its current version, the EES Regulation establishes a legal framework and
technical infrastructures providing for:
 The automatic data collection and systematic recording of external border crossing
movements of all third-country nationals (i.e. both visa-required or visa-exempt)
visiting the Schengen area for a short stay (maximum 90-day period in any period of
180 days); and
 The tracking of the time spent by the individual third country national during his/her
stay within the Schengen area. By recording entries and exits of each and every third-
country national the EES aims at calculating the length of their stay. In case of
detected overstay, the EES would raise an alert.
According to the EES Regulation, which also merges the proposal for the creation of a
Registered Traveller Programme (RTP), the new centralised EU database is due to become
operational in 2020. The European Agency for the Operational Management of large-scale IT
Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) is mandated to start building
the EES in cooperation with the Member States.
The Council of the European Union described the EES as an important tool for “improving
external border controls, and ... strengthen[ing] the fight against terrorism”.163 However, a
series of concerns have been raised with regard to the (disproportionate) impact that the
rollout of the EES is likely to have on the fundamental rights of the third country nationals
falling under its scope of application. Several EU bodies including the Committee of the
Regions (CoR),164 the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC),165 as well as the
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)166 and the FRA have expressed doubts as to the
compatibility of the EES with existing EU privacy and data protection standards. Concerns
related in particular to the fundamental rights implications deriving from the
establishment of a new EU system retaining large amounts of both personal and
biometric data.
In fact, in order to facilitate identification and return of overstayers, the new system allows
for generalised “biometric ID checks” which entail the collection of biometrics for
all third-country nationals travelling to the EU. In the first place, the EES foresees the
possibility to collect third-country nationals’ fingerprints or facial images allowing for the
creation of “a file” for each traveller. The file will then subsequently be used for re-
identification of the individual at every border crossing. According to the EES regulation, these
data will be retained in a centralised system, for up to five years.167 The EES applicability to
161 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an
Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of
the Member States of the European Union COM(2013/095) final.
162 Regulation (EU) 2017 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to
register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the
Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending
the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011.
163 Article 34.3 of the EES Regulation.
164 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on ‘Smart Borders package’, OJ C 114, 15.4.2014, p. 90–95.
165 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
A European Agenda on Migration’ (COM(2015) 240 final), OJ C 71, 24.2.2016, p. 46–52.
166 See the Executive Summary of the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on Personal Information
Management Systems, 2016/C 463/10.
167 Recital 33 of the EES Regulation.
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all TCNs will also significantly expand the overall EU’s biometric information system, as it
applies to each and every third-country national crossing the EU external borders.
Specific issues also derive from the fact that the EES will be interconnected with other large-
scale EU data bases, such as the VIS. The risks concerned with the interoperability of existing
EU databases have already been considered in the previous paragraph. The EES Regulation
fails to address key issues in that respect, including the risks deriving from the possibility of
granting different security forces access to the system. In fact, it seems that under the EES
data could be shared not only with authorities in the EU, but also with third countries,
international organisations, as well as private parties pursuant to the broad exceptions in the
Regulation.168 At the same time, it is not clear how the end users’ respect of privacy
and data protection standards will be ensured, given the lack of clear indications as
to the oversight and complaint mechanisms available to data subject in case of
abuses.
Also, a series of critiques pointed at the lack of transparency regarding the new system’s
actual necessity, costs and practical utility. Perplexities have in particular been expressed as
to the EES’ actual fitness to ensure swift border procedures. In this regard, the CoR noted
that collecting biometric data would increase travellers’ waiting time during borders check, a
remark which was also shared in the European Commission’s impact assessment. On the
other hand, longer waiting time increases the “risk of error”, as expressly indicated by the
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29).169 Not least important, there is uncertainty
regarding the actual capacity of the EES to achieve the system’s very own objective of tackling
irregular migration. In the respect the claimed ‘added value’ of the EES is that it will be able
to provide more accurate information about patterns of overstaying. While it is often claimed
that such persons comprise the largest category of ‘illegal migrants’ in the EU, accurate
statistics still do not exist.170 On the other hand, the expanded scope of application seems to
confirm that the EES constitutes yet another building block toward the establishment of “cyber
fortress Europe”.171
168 Article 38 EES Regulation.
169 Article 29 Opinion 05/2013 on Smart Borders, 06.06/2013.
170 Bigo, D., Carrera, S., Hayes, B., Hernanz, N., Jeandesboz, J. (2009), Evaluating current and forthcoming proposals
on JHA databases and a smart borders system at EU external borders, Study for the European Parliament, Policy
Department C: Citizens' Rights And Constitutional Affairs.
171 Guild, E., Carrera, S., Geyer, F., (2008), The Commission's New Border Package: Does it take us one step closer
to a 'cyber-fortress Europe'?, CESP Policy Brief, No. 154, March 2008
Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
48
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This Study has examined the latest legal and policy developments concerning the
state of the Schengen system since 2016. A key finding emerging from this assessment
is that the Schengen regime remains ‘crisis-proof’. It is however imperative for Member
States’ Ministries of Interior to move beyond crisis-modes of policy making on migration,
asylum and borders and to take up their political and legal responsibilities towards a stable
‘crisis-proof’ European Asylum System. This is particularly so in respect of the much-needed
reform of the EU Dublin Regulation and the establishment of a corrective allocation
mechanisms of permanent and automatic nature, for sharing responsivity in assessing asylum
applications in the EU.
All latest developments and proposals which have been included by the Commission in the
‘back to Schengen’ roadmap, including the various components comprising the EU’s
Integrated Border Management (IBM) concept, must be closely tight to existing EU democratic
rule of law and fundamental rights standards provided by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights and EU secondary legislation – chiefly the Schengen Borders Code.
The European Refugee Humanitarian Crisis must not continue to be used as an excuse to
reverse ‘Europeanisation’ or re-gain Ministries of Interior discretion in the Schengen area and
the checks and balances characterizing its current governance framework, where the
European Parliament has played a major role as co-legislator.
7.1. More scrutiny over internal border controls in the Schengen Area
All EU Member States which are still applying the reintroduction of internal border controls
should lift them as soon as possible so as fully comply with the procedures and criteria outlined
in the Schengen Borders Code. All the deadlines and procedures envisaged in Articles
25-29 SBC have expired and it is time for them to lift the border controls and bring
Schengen to ‘normality’. Decisions such as the one issued by the French Council of State
are misreading the provisions envisaged in the Schengen Borders Code and are not in
compliance with current EU Schengen rules.
The European Commission and the European Parliament should call all relevant
Member States to provide sound and full evidence about the proportionality,
necessity and ‘last resort nature’ of current border checks. Member States should also
provide evidence on the exact ways in which internal border checks help in addressing the
identified “threats” and challenges. Unless this is done at the earliest convenience, these
Member States should be called to respect their legal commitments in the Treaties and
secondary legislation. Member States should stop using potential or future “secondary
movements” of asylum seekers inside the EU as a ground justifying internal border checks.
They should instead speed up and increase the implementation of their pledges for relocations
from Italy and Greece.
The new Commission Proposal extending the time-periods for Member States to reintroduce
internal border checks calls for a careful added value assessment. It is not clear based on the
information provided in the Member States’ notifications that a revision of the SBC is actually
necessary, neither is the utility of extending currently envisaged time-periods. Moreover,
putting the extensions in the hands of Member States issuing a ‘Risk Assessment’ is a very
risky exercise in itself as it will not allow European institutions to precisely measure the
robustness and objectivity of the assessment to be provided by the Member State concerned.
The workings and spirit of Schengen cannot be abandoned at the expense of future potential
risks assessments of dubious accuracy and value. The proposed “risk assessment” is
further problematic, as the assessment is entirely placed in the hands of the state
that is reintroducing border controls.  It is clear that it is not only for the Member State
concerned to unilaterally assess what the situation or “risk” on the ground is, as a way to
justify the proportionality and necessity of internal border checks. Instead the Schengen
governance framework must be based on the best evidence and objective assessment
about the adequacy and proportionality of any exceptions applicable to the lifting of internal
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border checks. Any Member State introducing and/or prolonging internal border
checks beyond six months should be included into the Schengen Evaluation
Mechanism procedures and be subject to on-site (announced and unannounced)
evaluation visits reviewing their nature, effects and necessity.
Rather than on reforming the Schengen Evaluation Mechanisms - which did not show to be
dysfunctional nor ineffective in any way - new proposals should rather focus addressing the
major delays witnessed from the on-site visit to the implementing decisions and action plans.
In order to facilitate this process, the EU border monitor could be mandated to swiftly
initiate and handle remedial actions on the part of the Member States.
When the “threat” relates to the argument of “secondary movements”, a key role should be
foreseen for the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), and its currently discussed
transformation into a new EU Asylum Agency, to support the Member States concerned with
the optimisation and soundness of its national asylum systems. The proposed reform of
the Dublin III Regulation by the European Parliament172 should be adopted as soon
as possible by EU Member States. If no swift progress is made in that respect, the
European Parliament should freeze ongoing negotiations on all files which are of
interest to Justice and Home Affairs Ministries such as the recent interoperability
proposal, the revision of the Eurodac system173 any new financial frameworks and
other relevant files. The European Parliament has already successfully adopted this
approach with the so-called ‘Schengen freeze' back in 2012, when it decided to react to the
Council’s decisions to change the legal basis for the Schengen Governance Package with the
‘freeze’ of cooperation on the main JHA dossiers under negotiation.174
The European Parliament should call for the setting up of a formal complaint mechanism
system for EU citizens and third-country nationals whose rights and freedoms may be
jeopardised or violated in the context of internal border checks. An EU Border/Asylum Monitor
should be set up for these very purposes which would be deployed in relevant Member States’
sites where internal border checks are reintroduced and who would receive and take stock of
these individuals’ complaints.
7.2. Better monitoring of police checks within the Schengen Area
Aside from situations where internal border checks are introduced, the spread of internal
police checks also raises particular concerns regarding their legality in light of the Luxembourg
Court’s benchmarks. All EU Member States must make sure that their national legislation
complies with the legal standards which have been developed by the CJEU in order to
guarantee that they remain not equivalent to border checks and that their intensity, frequency
and selectivity complies with the SBC. Flexibility in the implementation of police checks blurs
the boundaries between what are proportionate police checks and what are border checks
contrary to the spirit of the SBC. A key goal should be to ensure legal certainty and
172 European Parliament, Draft Legislative Resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining
an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a
stateless person (recast), Report, 06.11.2017.
173 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [Regulation (EU) No
604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless
person], for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the
comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement
purposes (recast). COM(2016) 272, 2016/0132(COD) Brussels, 4.5.2016.
174 The five dossiers concerned were: Amendment of the Schengen Border Code and Convention implementing the
Schengen Agreement; Judicial cooperation in criminal matters: combating attacks against information systems;
European Investigation Order; Budget 2013 aspects relating to Internal Security; and EU Passenger Name Records.
See, S. Carrera, N. Hernanz, J. Parkin (2013), The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the European Parliament: Assessing Progress,
Shortcomings and Challenges for Democratic Accountability in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Study for
the European Parliament, Policy Department C – Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, PE 493.012.
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proportionality in the conduction of internal police checks and a non-discriminatory approach
in their application.
Instead of reintroducing internal border controls, and as proposed by the European
Commission Recommendation on proportionate police checks, EU Member States could give
priority to improving cross-border operational police cooperation in the fight against
criminality, in cooperation with relevant EU Agencies like Eurojust and Europol. There are
interesting potentials in making proper and efficient use of Joint Investigation Teams (JITs)
in full compliance with EU standards such as those envisaged in the European Investigation
Order (EIO).175 Special focus should be given to address their current JITs shortcomings –
both at legal and procedural levels.176
A key gap identified in this report is the quantitative scale and qualitative effects of internal
police checks in EU Member States. The EU should set up a systematic and permanent
monitoring system of EU Member States’ police checks falling within the scope of
the SBC for instance by including in the SIS II a reporting and statistical component.
Similarly, there should be a complaint mechanism effectively operating from the moment
when national police authorities meet the person on the move and include data or have access
to) EU information systems such as the SIS II, VIS or Eurodac, in particular regarding
compliance with EU privacy and data protection legal standards. This is particularly more
pertinent in light of the prospect of the ‘smart borders’ package and the current discussions
on the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS).
7.3. Erection of Border fences shall be brought back in line with the
SBC
The European refugee humanitarian crisis has also seen the erection of new physical border
walls and fences in several EU Member States sharing the common EU external border. The
SCB is clear when stating that there cannot be walls for refugees. The compatibility of
these fences and walls, and the practices surrounding them, should be more
carefully scrutinised by the European Commission, not only concerning their impact on
fundamental rights, but also from the standpoint of the ‘spirit of Schengen’. This Study reveals
that border walls and fences lead to a domino effect of illegal and exceptional practices which
should not be permissible by any EU Member State.
It would be central to clarify the compatibility of such practices with the right to
seek asylum as enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as with
the Schengen Borders Code, as the principle of non-refoulement is explicitly mentioned in
Article 14 of the SBC. Schengen Evaluation missions should be dedicated to assessing the role
and impacts of fences in light of the principle of sincere and loyal cooperation among EU
Member States, which is the founding principle of the Schengen Agreement and the SBC.
In addition, it would be important, in a similar fashion as for internal border controls, to notify
the European Commission and the Parliament, as well as neighbouring Member States, about
the very pressing reasons for the introduction of such fences. These notifications would need
to assess the proportionality and necessity, duration and impact on fundamental rights, as
well as the rights of EU citizens (e.g. private property) and broader political and environmental
impacts. One of the conditions could be, for example, whether the Member State concerned
has fully met its relocation quota. It would be difficult for Member States to invoke the fear
of secondary movements while their own pledges to accept asylum seekers have not been
fulfilled.
The realities of and practices at these fences should further be subject to SEM unannounced
visits The Frontex Consultative Forum should be given more independence in selecting and
interviewing border guards and Frontex officers as well civil society organisations, and access
175 European Commission, “As of today the "European Investigation Order" will help authorities to fight crime and
terrorism”, Press Release, 22 May 2017
176 S. Carrera, E. Guild, L. Vosyliūtė, A. Scherrer and V. Mitsilegas (2016), “The Cost of Non Europe in the Area of
Organised Crime”, Study for the European Parliament, DG EPRS, Brussels
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detained migrants and asylum seekers in the border areas where there are fences, whether
on the EU or the third-country side of the border.
7.4. Strengthening the role and independence of the EBCG
Consultative Forum and Fundamental Rights Officer
Regarding the roll-out of the EBCG, the currently envisaged complaint mechanism does not
offer an effective remedy in light of EU and international human rights standards. Independent
monitoring of all Frontex operational activities should be ensured through the enhancement
of the role of Frontex Consultative Forum. Its representatives should be granted presence at
relevant sites where border controls and surveillance take place. There should be a clearer
obligation and accountability for Frontex Executive Director Decisions to suspend EBCG
operations presenting fundamental rights or rule of law challenges.
The FRO should be granted the competence and means to effectively monitor the follow up
of complaints received by the agency and regarding Member States’ authorities. The FRO
should be entrusted with more human resources capacity and a wider power to closely monitor
how human rights complaints are followed up domestically by the responsible institutions
established at the national and/or local level. The FRO should be allowed to bring the issue
before the European Ombudsman in cases of inadequate follow up. This would ensure a
systematic implementation of the right of good administration envisaged in the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights.
7.5. Keeping Intact the Lisbonisation of the EU integrated border
management strategy
The participation of the EU institutions remains essential for the development of the European
Integrated Border Management strategy. In particular, the Commission, the European
Parliament, and the Council have the legal responsibility to shape the “political strategy”
underlying the operationalisation of the EIBM. The need for the EU co-legislators’ involvement
in the development of a European IBM system is not only required in the EBCG regulation,177
but ultimately derives from the post-Lisbon Treaty communitarisation of EU policies on
migration and border management. However, the development of an overarching EIBM
strategy should not mean reversing the Lisbonisation of the IBM concept.
All in all, the notion of interoperability challenges the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the concept of
IBM in the Lisbon Treaty and presents profound challenges to EU democratic, rule of law and
fundamental rights standards currently covering the Schengen governance framework. The
EES appears to contradict the well-established EU law requirement according to which access
to personal data should always be proportionate, narrowly targeted and triggered by a
suspicion as to a specific person.
Effective complaint mechanism should be established in order to allow individuals to access
and obtain remedies in case of abuses. The possibility to lodge individual complaints should
also be granted against abuses which might be committed through the deployment of smart
border checks and infrastructures.
177 Preamble 8 ECBG Regulation.
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ANNEX 1. UPDATED TIMELINE OF THE DEVELOPMENTS COVERED IN THE INITIAL STUDY
The Future of the Schengen Area: Latest Developments and Challenges in the Schengen Governance Framework since 2016
61
ANNEX 2. CHRONOLOGY OF THE SETTING UP OF FENCES AT THE EXTERNAL AND
INTERNAL SCHENGEN BORDERS
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ANNEX 3. ANALYSIS OF SCHENGEN STATE NOTIFICATIONS ON THE REINTRODUCTION OF
BORDER CONTROLS AT THE INTERNAL BORDERS OF THE SCHENGEN AREA (UPDATED),
SEPTEMBER 2015 – DECEMBER 2017
This is an update of the Analysis contained in Annex 3 of the 2016 study178 conducted for the European Parliament. The analysis conducted on
Schengen States’ notifications between September 2015 and May 2016 are attributable to the authors of the previous study.
Note on references to articles in the SBC Regulation: the Annex replicates the article references provided by Member State authorities
in their notifications. Notifications sent before the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (published in the OJ on 23.3.2016) use the old
article references of Regulation (EC) 562/2006, which is referred as SBC 2006.
Duration Grounds & Scope References
AUSTRIA
16.9.2015-
25.9.2015
10 days
26.9.2015-
15.10.2015
20 days
16.10.2015-
4.11.2015
20 days
5.11.2015-
15.11.2015
11 days
16.11.2015-
16.3.2016
Legal basis
Article 25 SBC 2006 (notification 17.09.2015, prolongations 28.09.2015,
16.10.2015)
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006 (prolongations – 18.11.2015, 15.02.2016, 16.3.2016)
Article 29(2) SBC (notifications – 13.5.2016, 25.11.2016, 13.2.2017, 12.5.2017)
No legal basis specified in notification 13.10.2017
Reasons
 ‘The security situation caused by the huge migration flows to and via Austria
and the reintroduction of border controls by Germany on 13 September 2015
[…] In view of the massive influx of third-country nationals, this measure is
inevitable in order to prevent a threat to public order and internal security and
a continuous overburdening of the police, emergency services and public
infrastructure […] The great willingness to help shown by the Republic of
Austria over the past weeks should not be overstretched. Under European law,
the Republic of Austria is not responsible for the vast majority of the persons
 Austrian delegation (2015) Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the
Austrian internal borders in accordance with
Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 12110/15,
17.09.2015
 Austrian delegation (2015) Prolongation of
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Austrian internal borders in accordance
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 12435/15,
28.09.2015
 Austrian delegation (2015) Prolongation of
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
178 Guild et al. (2016) Study for the European Parliament, PE 571.356“Internal border controls in the Schengen area: Is Schengen crisis-proof?”, Brussels.
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Duration Grounds & Scope References
120 days
16.03.2016-
15.05.2016
60 days
16.05.2016-
12.11.2016
180 days
12.11.2016-
11.02.2017
90 days
11.02.2017-
11.05.2017
90 days
11.05.2017-
11.11.2017
180 days
12.11.2017-
11.05.2018
180 days
concerned. This means that the Member State responsible not only registers
those seeking protection, but also deals with the asylum procedure and, if their
application for protection is rejected, takes measures to terminate their stay
[…] The single European legal framework can function in its entirety only if all
Member States act together to live up to their common responsibility’
(notification 17.9.2015)
 ‘Due to the enormous migration flows to and across Austria, the security
situation has continued to deteriorate dramatically […] Only last weekend, in
the time period from 18 to 21 September (15:00 hours) about 33.000 persons
have illegally entered Austria. In order to cope with such influx, 17,700
individual accommodations were created in Austria in the last few days. This is
a major challenge […] which can only be managed by controlling the influx of
these people in an orderly manner, and by police force and army using existing
transportation means to distribute refugees to available accommodations. It is
indispensable for this purpose, that the persons can be registered at the very
border, and that they can be given medical care and initial food provisions’
(prolongation notification 28.9.2015)
 ‘Between 5 September and 8 October 2015, 07.00, a total of 238,485 persons
were apprehended at the south-eastern borders of Austria, of which 9,107
applied for international protection in Austria. Since our last statement on 2
October, more than 44,000 persons apprehended […] Austria intends to extend
these internal border controls, depending on how the situation develops, on the
basis of Art. 23 and Art. 24 of the Schengen Borders Code. This is the only way
to avoid, wherever possible in practice and by law, security deficits in the
Schengen area for the benefit of our citizens’ (prolongation notification
16.10.2015)
 ‘As no significant change of the situation has occurred so far, Austria will
continue to carry out internal border controls until 15 February 2016 on the
basis of Articles 23 and 24 of the Schengen Borders Code. This is the only way
to prevent security deficits within the scope of what is legally and factually
possible in the interest of all citizens of the Schengen area’ (prolongation
notification 18.11.2015)
 ‘on account of the continuing influx […] to avoid security deficits in the future
[…] 268,520 persons have passed the Slovenian-Austrian border since 15
November 2015 […] Thousands of accommodations have been created in
Austria to cope with such influx of migrants. By 08 February 2016 (07:00 am),
a total of 12,500 provisional accommodations are operative, and there are
currently 4,964 vacancies still available’ (prolongation notification 15.2.2016)
– NB: ‘Austria would like to thank the European Commission for undertaking
the necessary steps to apply Article 26 of the Schengen Borders Code’
the Austrian internal borders in accordance
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 13127/15,
16.10.2015
 Austrian delegation (2015) Prolongation of
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Austrian internal borders in accordance
with Article 25, and thereafter on the basis of
Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 14211/15,
18.11.2015
 Austrian delegation (2016) Prolongation of
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Austrian internal borders in accordance
Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 6071/16,
15.02.2016
 Austrian delegation (2016) Prolongation of
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Austrian internal borders in accordance
Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 7136/16,
16.3.2016.
 Austrian delegation (2016) Prolongation of
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Austrian internal borders in accordance
with Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) No
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
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 ‘Although, not least because of the measures taken by Austria in close
cooperation with the West Balkan States, the situation at the Slovenian border
has somewhat eased, we cannot assume that any noticeable reduction of the
influx of third country nationals will be sustainable […] Austria, due to
ascertained and still prevailing serious flaws in external border controls in
Greece will continue to conduct internal border controls for another 2 months’
(prolongation notification 16.3.2016)
 ‘The Council has adopted a recommendation, based on the Commission’s
proposal, to prolong proportionate temporary controls at certain internal
Schengen borders for a maximum period of six months, due to exceptional
circumstances where the overall functioning of the Schengen area is put at risk’
(prolongation notification 13.5.2016)
 ‘On 11 November 2016 the Council adopted, on the basis of a Commission
proposal, an Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation for
temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the
overall function of the Schengen area at risk. […] The Republic of Austria will
apply this Implementing Decision accordingly, enabling temporary border
controls […] for a maximum time period of three months.’ (prolongation
notification 25.11.2016)
 ‘On 7 February 2017, the Council of the European Union, upon proposal by the
European Commission, adopted a Council Implementing Decision setting out a
recommendation for temporary internal border controls in exceptional
circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk. The
Republic of Austria will accordingly implement this Decision, which allows for
temporary border controls […] for a maximum time period of three months.’
(prolongation notification 13.2.2017)
 ‘On 11 May 2017, the Council of the European Union, upon proposal by the
European Commission, adopted a further Council Implementing Decision
setting out a recommendation for temporary internal border controls in
exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area
at risk. The Republic of Austria will accordingly purposefully implement this
Implementing Decision, which make possible temporary border controls […] for
a period of six months.’ (prolongation notification 12.5.2017)
 ‘The European Commission has announced that the Commission will not be able
to present a new proposal to the Council of the European Union concerning the
extension of internal border controls. Some Member States have suffered
severe terror attacks. The security situation in the European Union continues
to be tense. […] Still a deficit in the protection of the external borders as well
as a considerable amount of illegal secondary migration within the Schengen
area continues to exist. A serious threat to the public order and security comes
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 8947/16,
13.5.2016
 Austrian delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Austrian internal borders in accordance
with Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) No
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 14879/16, 25.11.2016
 Austrian delegation (2017) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Austrian internal borders in accordance
with Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) No
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 6252/17, 13.2.2017
 Austrian delegation (2017) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Austrian internal borders in accordance
with the Council Implementing Decision (EU)
2017/818. Brussels, Council document
9147/17, 12.5.2017
 Austrian delegation (2017) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Austrian internal borders in accordance
with Regulation 2016/399 on a Union Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council documents 13207/17,
13.10.2017 and Council document 13207/17
ADD 1, 18.10.2017
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Duration Grounds & Scope References
from this uncontrolled illegal migration. Austria is still facing a large number of
unregistered asylum seekers. […] Considering the current situation at the
Austrian-Hungarian and the Austrian-Slovenian border the present instruments
do not constitute a sufficient substitute for temporary border controls. […]
Therefore I have decided that internal border controls […] will be carried for 6
month beyond the 11th of November 2017.’ (prolongation notification
13.10.2017)
Scope
‘The main focus will be, firstly, the land border between Austria and Hungary, but
also the land borders with Italy, Slovenia and Slovakia’ (notification 17.9.2015)
‘It will be necessary to continue to temporarily position adequate police forces at
the border crossings initially with Hungary and Slovenia, subsequently if necessary
also at border crossings with other neighbouring States […] Austrian internal
Schengen land and air borders’ (prolongation notification 28.9.2015)
Not specified in prolongation notification 16.10.2015
Austrian-Slovenian border, detailed Annex in prolongation notification 18.11.2015,
whereby the ‘crossing of the internal border is […] only possible and permitted at
designated border crossings’
‘The focus will be, as before, at the Austrian-Slovenian border, but may be
transferred at any time in view of possible shifts of irregular migration flows’
(prolongation notification 15.2.2016)
‘The focal points will be at the Slovenian-Austrian, Hungarian-Austrian, and Italian-
Austrian borders, but in view of possible shifts of the irregular flows of migrants
such focal points may move at any time to other sections of our borders’
(prolongation notification 16.3.2016)
‘Austrian-Hungarian land border and Austrian-Slovenian land border’ (prolongation
notifications 13.05.2016, 25.11.2016 and 13.10.2017)
‘Austrian borders with Hungary and Slovenia’ (prolongation notification
13.02.2017)
‘Austrian land borders with Hungary and Slovenia’ (prolongation notification
12.5.2017)
BELGIUM
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Duration Grounds & Scope References
23.2.2016-
23.3.2016
<30 days
24.3.2016-
12.4.2016
<20 days
Legal basis
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006 (25.2.2016)
Modified to Article 25 SBC 2006 (11.3.2016)
Prolonged with reference to Article 25.3 SBC 2006 and Article 23-24 SBC 2006
(22.3.2016), then Article 25 and 23 & 24 SBC 2006 (29.3.2016)
Reasons
 ‘serious risk to public order and internal security because of very large numbers
of illegal migrants that can be expected in the coastal region of Belgium within
a short period of time […] measure to prevent escalating situation’ (notification
25.2.2016)
 ‘The Belgian authorities expect the announced closure and evacuation of the
migrant camps in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region in France, to have a serious
impact on Belgian territory’ (notification 25.2.2016)
 ‘We have come to understand that the procedure under article 25 [SBC] […]
applies to situations where a serious threat to the public policy or internal
security in a Member State requires immediate action to be taken, including
the case of an evolving situation which requires urgent action’ (notification
11.3.2016)
 ‘The Police are confronted with an increasing number of criminal organisations
involved in the trafficking and smuggling of human beings to West-Vlaanderen
and to the Port of Zeebrugge. Violent incidents with these criminal
organisations are reported far more frequently than before […] visual presence
of the significantly increased number of irregular and homeless migrants has a
direct and non-negligible negative impact on public security […] security
situation in the Port of Zeebrugge has deteriorated frighteningly due to the
regular illegal intrusions in the portal area […] The expected and announced
closures of illegal settlements of migrants around the main portal areas of
Calais and Dunkirk in the North of France will most likely generate a further
significant growth of the number of irregular migrants’ (notification 25.2.2016)
 ‘Even though the number of transmigrants dropped significantly in the days
following the implementation of the border controls, indicating the dissuasive
effect of our measures, the security impact remains high […] to do everything
possible to prevent the emergence of tent camps that have a serious impact
on the internal security […] many migrants try to get into the Zeebrugge port
area which results in well-known security and safety risks […] hazards to the
 Belgian delegation (2016) Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the Belgian
internal borders in accordance with Article 23
and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 6490/16,
25.2.2016
 Belgian delegation (2016) Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the Belgian
internal borders in accordance with Article 25
of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a
Community Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across Schengen
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 6490/1/16, 11.3.2016
 Belgian delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Belgian internal borders in accordance with
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 7351/16,
22.3.2016
 Belgian delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Belgian internal borders in accordance with
Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 7351/1/16,
29.3.2016
 Belgian delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Belgian internal borders in accordance with
Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
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physical integrity and wellbeing of the migrants […] also a lot of material
damage. In addition, this has an impact on the general feeling of insecurity of
the inhabitants of the region […] The border controls of the past month […]
have had an impact on organised immigration crime, since special attention
was also given to human smuggling’ (prolongation notification, 22.3.2016)
 ‘number of intercepted transmigrants has dropped after the introduction of
border controls at the end of February, but last week a new rise could be
noticed. The risk is real that this rise will continue because of the start of the
summer season and the better weather conditions […] one also needs to take
into account the further evacuation of tent camps in the north of France’
(prolongation notification 13.4.2016)
Scope
Land border between the Province of West-Vlaanderen and France
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 7873/16,
13.4.2016
DENMARK
04.01.2016-
03.04.2016
<90 days
04.04.2016-
03.05.2016
30 days
04.05.2016-
02.06.2016
30 days
12.05.2016-
12.11.2016
180 days
12.11.2016-
11.02.2017
90 days
Legal basis
Articles 23 & 25 SBC 2006
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006 (prolongation notification 4.3.2016)
Article 29 (2) SBC (prolongation notification 2.6.2016, 25.11.2016, 15.2.2017,
19.5.2017)
Articles 25 & 27 SBC (prolongation notification 12.10.2017)
Reasons
 ‘Since the beginning of September 2015 […] more than 91.000 migrants and
refugees have crossed the border between Denmark and Germany […] more
than 13.000 people have applied for asylum in Denmark bringing the total
number of asylum seekers in 2015 up to more than 21.000. […] Furthermore
[…] at least 50 percent of the persons who have crossed the border between
Denmark and Germany are not in possession of a passport or lawful
identification […] The Swedish, the Norwegian and the German Governments
have already temporarily reintroduced border controls at their internal borders.
Furthermore, today on 4 January 2016 the Swedish Government has
 Danish delegation (2016) Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the Danish
internal borders in accordance with Article 23
and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 5021/16,
5.1.2016
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Danish internal borders in accordance with
Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 5247/16,
14.1.2016
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Danish internal borders in accordance with
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11.02.2017-
11.05.2017
90 days
11.05.2017-
11.11.2017
180 days
12.11.2017-
11.05.2018
180 days
implemented a new regulation obliging carriers to ensure that the persons they
are transporting into Sweden are in possession of identity documents […] Given
that there is no land border between Denmark and Sweden, the internal border
control reintroduced by the Swedish Government combined with the new
regulation […] will in fact result in a closed border for immigrants and asylum
seekers with no identification […] Due to these measures set in place by our
neighboring countries and particularly the measures set in place by Sweden,
Denmark is of now faced with a serious risk to public order and international
security because a very large number of illegal immigrants may be stranded in
the Copenhagen area within a short period of time’ (notification 5.1.2016)
 ‘On 7 January 2016, the Swedish Government decided to prolong the border
control at the Swedish internal borders until 8 February 2016. Furthermore,
the Swedish regulation [mentioned in previous letter] […] is still in force […]
the number of immigrants crossing EU’s southern external borders and
continuing their journey further north remains very high’ (prolongation
notification 14.1.2016)
 ‘On 4 February 2016, the Swedish Government decided to prolong the border
control at the Swedish internal borders until 9 March 2016 […] The number of
asylum seekers in Europe are still historically high, and according to Frontex,
there is an ongoing pressure on Europe’s external borders. Our neighboring
countries to the North have prolonged their temporary border controls and still
have ID-controls at their internal borders in order to reduce the numbers of
asylum seekers. These measures have […] left Denmark with a serious risk to
public policy and internal security if the Danish border control were to be lifted
at this point’ (prolongation notifications of 23.2.2016 and 4.3.2016)
 ‘From 6 September 2015 […] until 27 March, the Danish Police assesses that a
total of approximately 94,700 immigrants and asylum seekers have entered
Denmark. From 4 January until 27 March 2016, approximately 2,850
immigrants and asylum seekers have entered Denmark and approximately
488,000 people have been checked at border crossings. In the same period,
984 people have been refused entry and 127 people have been charged with
human trafficking […] The Danish Police has not since 4 January 2016 reported
any build-up of illegal immigrants anywhere in the country […] Denmark has
received a historical high number of asylum seekers in 2015. In November
alone, Denmark received around 5,100 asylum seekers including around 500
unaccompanied minor asylum seekers […] Even though the number of asylum
seekers has decreased since the introduction of temporary border controls, the
number of asylum seekers seems to remain at a relatively high level’. Follows
the reference to Swedish border controls (prolongation notification 1.4.2016)
Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 5786/16,
3.2.2016
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Danish internal borders in accordance with
Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 6440/16,
23.2.2016
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Danish internal borders in accordance with
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 6754/16,
4.3.2016
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Danish internal borders in accordance with
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 7499/16,
1.4.2016
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Danish internal borders in accordance with
Articles 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU)
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
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 ‘The decision to temporarily reintroduce border control at the Danish internal
borders was made due to the measures set in place by our neighbouring
countries and particularly the measures set in place by Sweden. As a
consequence of these measures, Denmark is faced with a serious risk to public
order and internal security because a very large number of illegal immigrants
might be stranded in the Copenhagen area within a short period of time […]
The numbers of asylum seekers in Europe are still historically high, and
according to Frontex, there is an ongoing pressure on Europe’s external
borders. Our neighboring countries to the North have prolonged their
temporary border controls and still have ID-controls at their internal borders in
order to reduce the number of asylum seekers’ (notification prolongation
3.5.2016)
 Council Implementing Decision of 12 May 2016 (prolongation notification
2.6.2016)
 ‘On 11 November 2016, the Council of the European Union adopted an
implementing decision setting out a recommendation for temporary internal
border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of
the Schengen area at risk. […] Denmark will apply the implementing decision,
which allows temporary border checks […] for a maximum period of three
months, starting from the day of the adoption of the Decision.’ (prolongation
notification 25.11.2016)
 ‘On 7 February 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted an
implementing decision setting out a recommendation for temporary internal
border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of
the Schengen area at risk. […] Denmark will apply the implementing decision,
which allows temporary border checks […] for a maximum period of three
months, starting from the day of the adoption of the Decision.’ (prolongation
notification 15.2.2017)
 ‘On 11 May 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted an implementing
decision setting out a recommendation for temporary internal border control in
exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area
at risk. […] Denmark will apply the implementing decision, which allows
temporary border controls […] for a maximum period of six months, starting
from the day of the adoption of the Decision.’ (prolongation notification
19.5.2017)
 ‘The many failed, foiled and completed terrorist attacks carried out in EU
Member States in 2016 and 2017 have demonstrated […] that terrorist groups
are likely to try to take advantage of deficiencies in our border controls […].
The persistent shortcomings and structural deficiencies at the EU external
borders […] facilitate significant irregular secondary migration within the
Brussels, Council document 8571/16,
3.5.2016
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Norwegian internal borders in accordance
with Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399
on a Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across Schengen
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 9792/16, 2.6.2016
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Danish internal borders in accordance with
Articles 29(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on
a Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 14876/16, 25.11.2016
 Danish delegation (2017) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Danish internal borders in accordance with
Articles 29(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on
a Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 6366/17, 15.2.2017
 Danish delegation (2017) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Danish internal borders in accordance with
the Council Implementing Decision (EU)
2017/818. Brussels, Council document
9512/17, 19.5.2017
 Danish delegation (2017) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Danish internal borders in accordance with
Articles 25 and 27 of Regulation 2016/399 on
a Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
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Schengen area, which constitutes a real threat to the public order and internal
security in our societies. Furthermore, the large number of irregular migrants
and failed asylum seekers present in our neighbouring countries that are
waiting to be returned to their country of origin or transit poses a real security
threat, as there is a risk that some terrorist group will exploit their vulnerable
situation.’ (prolongation notification 12.10.2017)
Scope
‘The border control may extend to all internal borders, including land-, sea- and air
borders, whereby the specific border sections and border crossing points are
determined by the Danish Police. The border control will initially focus on the ferries
arriving from Germany to the harbours in Gedser, Roedby and Roenne, and the
land border between Denmark and Germany’ (notification 5.1.2016).
‘The border control will, however, remain focused on the ferries arriving from
Germany and the land border between Denmark and Germany’ (prolongation
notification 14.1.2016).
Prolongation notification of 1.4.2016 specifies ‘the Danish-German border in
Southern Jutland’.
‘Danish ports with ferry connections to Germany and at the Danish-German land
border’ (prolongation notifications 2.6.2016, 25.11.2016, 15.2.2017, 19.5.2017)
Prolongation notification 12.10.2017 does not specify the concrete scope of the
internal border controls.
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 13141/17, 12.10.2017
FRANCE
13.11.2015 –
13.12.2015
30 days
14.12.2015 –
27.04.2016
<90 days
27.04.2016 –
26.05.2016
30 days
Legal basis
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006 (notification of 22.10.2015, prolongations - 10.12.2015,
11.02.2016, 29.03.2016)
Prolongation notification of 29.3.2016 explicitly cites Articles 23(3) and 23a SBC
2006;
Articles 25 & 26 SBC (prolongation notification of 26.04.2016);
Articles 25 & 27 SBC (notifications of 27.05.2016, 27.7.2016, 10.1.2017,
21.6.2017);
Reasons
 French delegation (2015), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the French
internal borders in accordance with Articles 23
and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document, 13171/15, 22.10.2015.
 French delegation (2015), Prolongation of
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the French internal borders in accordance with
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27.05.2016 –
26.07.2016
30 days
27.07.2016 –
26.01.2017
180 days
27.01.2017 –
15.07.2017
< 180 days
16.07.2017 –
31.10.2017
< 120 days
01.11.2017 –
30.04.2018
180 days
 Initial notification in French linked reintroduction of internal border controls at
identified border crossings to the UN Climate Change Summit (COP21), that
was held in Paris from 30th of November to 11 of December (notification of
22.10.2015)
 ‘The terrorist attacks that took place in Paris on 13 November 2015 led the
government to declare a state of emergency throughout the country […] owing
to the imminent danger resulting from serious breaches of public order’
(prolongation notification 10.12.2015)
 ‘Given that the terrorist threat remains, the French Government has decided to
extend the reintroduction of controls at its borders with all neighbouring
countries for a period of 30 days, i.e. 27 February to 27 March’ (prolongation
notification 11.02.2016)
 ‘Following the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 and the state of
emergency imposed in France for three months, then renewed for three months
[…] due to the ongoing terrorist threat, the French Government has decided to
extend the reintroduction of controls at its borders with all neighbouring
countries for a period of 30 days, i.e. 28 March to 26 April 2016 (prolongation
od 29.03.2016).
 ‘In light of the major ongoing terrorist threat, illustrated by the attack on
Brussels on 22 March 2016, the French Government has decided to extend
these border controls until 26 May 2016 inclusive.’ (prolongation notification of
26.04.2016).
 ‘France will soon be hosting two major sporting events on its mainland
territory: UEFA Euro 2016 from 10 June to 10 July 2016, and the Tour de
France from 2 to 24 July 2016. Given the magnitude of these events and the
millions of spectators they will attract from many countries, as well as the risk
analysis which has been carried out, there is an expected risk of disturbances
to public order arising from these events. This risk is heightened by the
terrorist threat which France and the whole of Europe have been facing in
recent months. […] France has decided to reintroduce border controls […] for
the period from 27 May to 26 July 2016.’ (notification 27.05.2016)
 ‘Tragically, the attack in Nice on 14 July confirms the ongoing threat of
terrorism faced by France. […] As evidenced by the attacks of 13 November
2015, crossing the external and internal borders of the Schengen area is part
of the terrorist groups' strategy, which sometimes involves preparing attacks
in one Member State from the territory of another Member State. […] The
current migratory situation reinforces the link between the terrorist threat
and the crossing of borders.’ (notification 27.7.2016)
 ‘Against this background, the French Government decided to draft a bill
extending the state of emergency until 15 July 2017, which was adopted by
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 15181/15,
10.12.2015
 French delegation (2016), Prolongation of
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the French internal borders in accordance with
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 5981/16,
11.02.2016
 French delegation (2016), Prolongation of
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the French internal borders in accordance with
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 7360/1/16,
29.03.2016
 French delegation (2016), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the French internal borders in accordance with
Articles 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU)
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
borders (Schengen Borders Code), Council
document 8217/16, Brussels, 26.04.2016.
 French delegation (2016), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the French
internal borders in accordance with Articles 25
and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 9506/16, 27.05.2016.
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Parliament. It has been confirmed that crossing the external and internal
borders of the Schengen area is part of the terrorist groups’ strategy, which
often involves preparing attacks in one Member State from the territory of a
neighbouring Member State. Moreover, the current situation reinforces the
link between the terrorist threat and the crossing of borders owing to the
geographical proximity of migratory routes to the regions at the source of the
terrorist threat […]’ (notification 10.1.2017)
 ‘The attacks on 13 November 2015, followed by the implementation of the
state of emergency, the organisation of major sporting events on national
territory, the attack in Nice on 14 July 2016 and the persistence of the
terrorist threat led the government to reintroduce controls at France’s internal
borders, for various reasons, from 13 November 2015 until 26 July 2016 and
then from 27 July 2016 until 15 July 2017. The various attacks on national
territory, in particular the attacks in Nice on 14 July 2016 and recently in
Paris, as well as those in the UK, show that the terrorist threat remains acute.
[…] Against this background, the French Government decided to draft a bill
extending the state of emergency until 31 October 2017.’ (notification
21.6.2017)
 ‘Since the Paris attack on 13 November 2015 and the Nice attacks
perpetrated on 14 July 2016, the terrorist threat has remained high on the
French territory. This has been demonstrated by the attacks of the last
months in Paris, in front of the Louvre museum on February 3rd, on the
Champs-Elysées on April 20th, on the esplanade of the cathedral Notre-Dame
on June 6th, and the 1st of October in front of the Saint-Charles train station in
Marseille. […] Faced with the terrorism threat which remains significant, the
French government took measures in order to reinforce the means at its
disposal. […] The bill on internal security and fight against terrorism, which
was adopted by the National Assembly on the 3rd of October […]. That is why,
in the context of the high terrorism risk, and as a complement to the other
measures aiming at fighting terrorism described above, France will renew its
border controls […].’ (notification 6.10.2017)
Scope
General scope - ‘internal borders with Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, the Swiss
Confederation, Italy and Spain, and at the air borders’ (all notifications of the
French delegation)
NB: reintroduction of border controls prolonged from the re-imposition initially
linked to COP21, then prolongation was linked to Paris attacks. Finally, the French
authorities have re-started the procedure of notifications on 27 of May, 2016, with
 French delegation (2016), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the French
internal borders in accordance with Articles 25
and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 11514/16, 27.7.2016.
 French delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the French
internal borders in accordance with Articles 25
and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 5055/17, 10.1.2017.
 French delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the French
internal borders in accordance with Articles 25
and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 10365/17, 21.6.2017.
 French delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the French
internal borders in accordance with Articles 25
and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 12933/17, 6.10.2017.
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a new foreseeable threat due to UEFA Euro 2016 and Tour de France sporting
events and inter-related terrorist threat.
GERMANY
13.09.2015-
22.09.2015
23.09.2015-
12.10.2015
13.10.2015-
01.11.2015
02.11.2015-
13.11.2015
<60 days
14.11.2015-
13.05.2016
<180 days
13.05.2016–
12.11.2016
180 days
12.11.2016-
11.02.2017
90 days
12.02.2017-
11.05.2017
90 days
12.05.2017-
11.11.2017
180 days
12.06.2017-
11.07.2017
Legal basis
Art. 25 SBC 2006
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006
Article 29 (2) SBC
Article 25 SBC
Reasons
 ‘This action is urgently needed in view of the enormous influx of third-country
nationals referred to above. We must know who is entering and staying in
Germany. Further arrivals would endanger the public order and internal
security […] Over the past weeks, there has been a great willingness in
Germany to help. We must not wear out this good will. According to European
law, the Federal Republic of Germany is not responsible for the large majority
of these persons. The Common European Asylum System, including the Dublin
process and the EURODAC regulations, continues to apply. This means that the
responsible Member State must not only register those seeking protection, but
must also process their applications and take measures to end their stay if their
application for protection is rejected’ (notification 14.9.2015)
 ‘The situation remains the same. The massive influx of third-country nationals
continues unabated. For reasons of public safety and public order, a structured
procedure, especially in terms of registration and vetting of third-country
nationals, continues to be urgently necessary. Especially in view of the
thousands of third-country nationals coming to Germany from crisis and conflict
regions, we must avoid security deficits, wherever possible in practice and by
the law, for the benefit of our citizens’ (prolongation notification 13.10.2015 –
NB: dated 22.9.2015, received by Council SecGen 8.10.2015)
 ‘The uncontrolled and massive influx of third-country nationals via the external
borders that we are currently experiencing continues unabated. This and the
fact that third-country nationals travel on within the Schengen area is not
acceptable. I am now informing you that I intend to extend these internal
border checks, depending on how the situation develops, on the basis of
Articles 23 and 24 of the Schengen Borders Code. This is the only way to avoid,
wherever possible in practice and by law, security deficits in the Schengen area
 German delegation (2015) Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the
German internal borders in accordance with
Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document, 11988/15,
14.09.2015.
 German delegation (2015) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the German internal borders in accordance
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document, 12984/15,
13.10.2015.
 German delegation (2015) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the German internal borders in accordance
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document, 12985/15,
13.10.2015.
 German delegation (2015) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the German internal borders in accordance
with Article 25, and thereafter on the basis of
Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
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< 30 days
12.11.2017-
11.05.2018
180 days
for the benefit of our citizens’ (prolongation notification 13.10.2015 – NB dated
9.10.2015, received by Council SecGen 12.10.2015)
 ‘The Federal Republic of Germany continues to receive an unprecedented and
uncontrolled influx of migrants seeking asylum. No other Member State of the
European Union is affected to such a degree. This influx seriously affects
Germany’s public order and internal security in various ways […] I would also
like to reiterate that the situation in Germany mainly depends on the measures
taken by the responsible Member States to protect the EU’s external borders.
Unfortunately, I still have the impression that, despite European assistance,
the necessary level of protection is not guaranteed. Moreover, transit countries
within the Schengen area seem to be unable or unwilling to take the measures
required by EU legislation to register and check each and every migrant.
Especially with regard to persons who may have been radicalized in crisis and
conflict regions, threats related to uncontrolled migration are obvious. Human
smuggling and related crime have developed in a way that is not acceptable’
(prolongation notification 30.10.2015)
 ‘No lasting or significant reduction in the numbers of third-country nationals
entering German territory has occurred which would unable the suspension of
temporary controls at the internal borders […] temporary border checks
concentrated on the internal land borders between Germany and Austria
continue to be an effective and necessary instrument to ensure orderly
procedures at the border (including checking databases of wanted persons,
photographing and fingerprinting those entering, denying entry to third-
country nationals who are not seeking protection and who entered the
Schengen area illegally) to manage the influx of refugees and address aspects
of public order and internal security. To prevent any security gaps, we have
made further progress especially with regard to photographing and
fingerprinting those entering Germany […] Together, we in Europe must
succeed in significantly reducing and slowing the influx of refugees in order not
to place excessive demands on our citizens and to prevent resentment’
(prolongation notification 12.2.2016)
 NB: ‘If the migration situation does not change significantly by May 2016,
checks at the German borders will still be necessary. With this in mind, I am
glad that the European Commission is now examining the application of the
crisis mechanism pursuant to Article 26 of the Schengen Borders Code’
(prolongation notification 12.2.2016)
 ‘On 12 May 2016, the Council of the European Union, at the proposal of the
European Commission, adopted a “Draft Council Implementing Decision setting
out a Recommendation for temporary internal border control in exceptional
circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk”. […]
Brussels, Council document, 13569/15,
30.10.2015.
 German delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the German internal borders in accordance
with Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, Council document, 6048/16,
12.02.2016.
 German delegation (2016), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the German internal borders in accordance
with Articles 29(2) of Regulation (EU) No
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
borders (Schengen Borders Code), Brussels,
Council document 8930/16, 13.05.2016.
 German delegation (2016), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the German internal borders in accordance
with Articles 29(2) of Regulation (EU) No
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 14880/16, 25.11.2016.
 German delegation (2017), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the German internal borders in accordance
with Articles 29 of Regulation (EU) No
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 6255/17, 13.2.2017.
 German delegation (2017), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the German internal borders in accordance
with the Council Implementing Decision (EU)
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the Federal Republic of Germany will apply the Implementing Decision, which
allows temporary border checks […] for a maximum period of six months,
starting from the day of the adoption of the Decision by the Council.’
(prolongation notification 13.05.2016; similar reasons for prolongation
notifications 21.11.2016, 13.2.2017, 12.5.2017)
 ‘Due to the higher security requirements during the G20 Summit of heads of
state and government, which will take place in Hamburg from 7 to 8 July 2017,
I have decided to reinstate internal border controls at Germany’s Schengen
borders […]’. (notification 18.5.2017)
 N.B. Notification of the German delegation of 18.5.2017 does not indicate the
period of temporary internal border controls. This period is subsequently
notified in the German delegation’s notification of 9.6.2017 (i.e. 12 June – 11
July 2017).
 ‘The European Commission announced that it will not be able to present
another proposal on prolonging internal border controls to the Council of the
European Union. Germany and other European Member States have witnessed
dramatic terrorist attacks. The European security situation remains tense. […]
Shortcomings in the protection of the external borders and significant irregular
migration creates serious threats to public security and order.’ (notification
12.10.2017)
 N.B. Notification of the German delegation of 12.10.2017 reinstated temporary
internal border controls for a time period of six months. Subsequent German
notification of 15.12.2017 seems to imply that Germany intends to continuously
invoke temporary internal border control periods of 30 days, up to the
maximum of six months.
Scope
‘Germany’s Schengen land, air and sea borders as the situation requires […] The
controls will initially be concentrated on the German-Austrian land border’
(notification 14.9.2015)
‘the German-Austrian borders’ (prolongation notifications 13.05.2016)
‘the German-Austrian land border’ (prolongation notification 25.11.2016,
13.2.2017, 12.5.2017, 12.10.2017)
‘at Germany’s land, air and sea borders […]’, though not further specified
(notification 18.5.2017)
2017/818. Brussels, Council document
9145/17, 12.5.2017.
 German delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the
German internal borders in accordance with
Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
Document 9006/17, 18.5.2017.
 German delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the
German internal borders in accordance with
Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 10186/17, 9.6.2017.
 German delegation (2017), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the German internal borders in accordance
with Regulation 2016/399 on a Union Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 13142/17,
12.10.2017.
 German delegation (2017), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the German internal borders in accordance
with Regulation 2016/399 on a Union Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 15828/17,
15.12.2017.
ITALY
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10.05.2017-
30.05.2017
<30 days
Legal basis
Article 25 SBC
Reasons
 ‘[…] security needs related to the development of the G7 Summit that will be
held in Taormina from 26 to 27 of May 2017’
Scope
 ‘All the national internal borders’
 Italian delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the Italian
borders in accordance with Article 25 of
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on
the rules of the governing the movement of
persons across borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, Council document 8182/17,
11.4.2017.
MALTA
09.11.2015-
13.11.2015
21.11.2015-
29.11.2015
<30 days
21.01.2017-
09.02.2017
< 30 days
Legal basis
Article 23 et seq SBC
Reasons
 Valetta Conference on Migration and Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting and terrorist threat and smuggling of illegal migrants (European
Commission) ‘threat scenarios in international major events and also in the
light of the continuous risk of Islamic terrorist illicit activities and attacks’ (initial
notification, 16.10.2015 and subsequent prolongations)
 NB. The initial Maltese delegation’s notification of 16.10.2015 noted the
intention of reintroduction temporary internal border controls from 4 November
to 3 December 2015. The subsequent notification of 6.11.2015 amended these
dates to 9-13 November 2015 and 21-29 November 2015.
 ‘Threat scenarios in international major events and particularly in the light of
the continuous risk of terrorist activities and attacks’ (report 16.12.2015)
 ‘The situation with regard to the global terrorist threat, as well as in view of the
fact that Malta was in the process of addressing a smuggling ring that was
targeting Malta as a destination for illegal migrants travelling from other
Schengen States, which had emerged from the controls carried out in the
previous period where the controls were reintroduced in view of the Valletta
Summit on Migration and the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM)
Meeting. The retention of border control was also deemed necessary wth a view
to detecting any potential threats to other Member States. The Maltese
government also took into account Malta’s proximity to Libya, where the
situation of instability facilitates the promulgation of extremist ideology across
the territory’ (report 26.02.2016)
 Maltese delegation (2015) Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the Maltese
internal borders in accordance with Article 23
of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a
Community Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across Schengen
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 13129/15, 16.10.2015.
 Maltese delegation (2015) Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the Maltese
internal borders in accordance with Article 23
of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a
Community Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across Schengen
borders (Schengen Borders Code) – change of
dates. Brussels, Council document 13788/15,
06.11.2015.
 Maltese delegation (2015) Report on the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Maltese internal borders in accordance with
Article 23 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 15366/15,
16.12.2015.
 Maltese delegation (2016) Report on the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
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 ‘On 3 February 2017, the Malta Informal Summit 2017 will be held in Malta.
The Joint Valetta Action Plan Senior Officials Meeting will then be held in Malta
on 8-9 February 2017. The Malta Informa Summit will be a major event […].
The Joint Valetta Action Plan Senior Officials Meeting will also be a major event
[…]. In addition to this, the past event which have been experienced in different
parts of the European Union demonstrate the heightened security risk that
currently prevails.’ (notification 20.1.2017)
Scope
 Malta International Airport
 Valletta Sea Passenger Terminal
the Maltese internal borders in accordance with
Article 29 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 6514/16,
26.2.2016
 Maltese delegation (2017), Reintroduction of
temporary border controls at the Maltese air
and sea borders in accordance with Articles 25
and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 5206/17, 20.1.2017
NORWAY
26.11.2015-
06.12.2015
(10 days)
15.01.2016
(60 days Art. 25)
15.01.2016–
12.05.2016
(120 days, Art.
24)
12.05.2016–
11.06.2016
(30 days, Art. 26)
12.05.2016-
11.11.2016
180 days
Legal basis
Articles 23 & 25 SBC 2006 (notification 25.11.2015)
Article 25 SBC 2006 (prolongation notification 04.12.2015)
Article 24 SBC 2006 (prolongation notification of 15.01.2016, 12.02.2016,
15.03.2016, 14.04.2016)
Article 26 SBC (prolongation notification of 12.05.2016)
Article 29(2) SBC (prolongation notifications 10.06.2016, 11.11.2016, 13.2.2017)
Council Implementing Decision 2017/818 (prolongation notification 17.5.2017)
Article 25 SBC (notification 25.8.2017)
Article 25 & 27 SBC (prolongation notification 13.10.2017)
Reasons
 ‘Norway is […] currently facing an unpredictable migratory flow, containing a
mix of asylum seekers, economic migrants, potential criminals such as
smugglers or traffickers of human beings, also including potential victims of
crime […] also knowing that many of the migrants arriving to Norway have not
been subject to border control upon arrival to the EU/Schengen territory, there
 Norwegian delegation (2015) Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the
Norwegian internal borders in accordance with
Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, 14633/15, 25.11.2015
 Norwegian delegation (2015) Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, 14996/15, 04.12.2015
 Norwegian delegation (2015) Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
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12.11.2016-
11.02.2017
90 days
12.02.2017-
11.05.2017
90 days
12.05.2017-
11.11.2017
180 days
26.08.2017-
25.09.2017
30 days
12.11.2017-
11.05.2018
180 days
is a need already at the internal borders to distinguish between the different
categories of arriving migrants. Border control will help identifying the different
categories of migrants, enabling adequate support and control procedures, i.e.
registration, further identification and return of those in no need for protection
[…] the current number of migrants arriving to Norway, and the consequences
for Norwegian society’ (notification 25.11.2015)
 ‘There has been a decrease in the number of migrants applying for asylum in
Norway lately, but the number is still very high, and we still experience an
uncontrolled and unpredictable influx of migrants. We thereby find the
conditions and reasoning in […] letter of 25. November for reintroduction of
border control still to be valid’ (prolongation notification 4.12.2015)
 ‘There has been a further decrease in the number of migrants applying for
asylum in Norway. The measures taken, including the reintroduction of internal
border control at our sea borders, have had the desired effect. We have during
this period been able to distinguish between the different categories of arriving
migrants already on the internal border. Although there has been a significant
decrease in the number of migrants applying for asylum in Norway, we fear
that the situation may change rapidly again if we abolish the introduced internal
border control’ (prolongation notification 21.12.2015).
 ‘Since our letter 18 December 2015, there has been a further decrease in the
number of migrants applying for asylum in Norway. Although there has been a
significant decrease in the number of migrants applying for asylum in Norway,
we fear that the situation may change rapidly again if we abolish the introduced
internal border control.  We thereby find the conditions and reasoning in my
letters dated 25, November and 18 December still to be valid’. Prolongation
notification, 15.01.2016).
 ‘Since our letter dated 14 January, there has been a further decreese in number
of of asylum seekers in Norway. However, we fear that this might change if
border controls are lifted. Furthermore, as explained in my letter to
Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos dated 28, January 2016, the Schengen
external borders and the established migrant routes intra Schengen are not
sufficiently controlled by the competent authorities at the moment, making
illegal entry and secondary movements by unregistered migrants as a factor of
concern.’ (prolongation notification 12.02.2016).
 ‘Since our letter dated 12.02.2016, the number of asylum seekers arriving in
Norway continues to be low. However, we fear that this might change if controls
are lifted as migratory pressure at the external border remains significant.’
(prolongation notification 15.03.2016 and the same reasons reiterated in
prolongation notification 14.04.2016).
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, 15497/15, 21.12.2015.
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 5294/16,
15.01.2016.
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 6043/16,
12.02.2016.
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 7122/16,
15.03.2016.
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with Article 24 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 7948/16,
14.04.2016.
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
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 In 12.05.2016 prolongation notification the lines above are reiterated though
it is added ‘It is also important to view situation in the Nordic countries as a
whole, and it is therefore for Norway to maintain the border controls along the
internal borders under Art.24’ (NB. Council wrongly referred to new article 26
instead 27).
 ‘On May 12, the council of the European Union, at the proposal of the European
Commission, adopted the Recommendation for temporary internal border
control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the
Schengen area at risk. […] Norway will apply the recommendation set out in
the Implementing Decision, which allows temporary border checks […] for a
maximum period of six months, starting from the day of the adoption of the
Decision by the Council.’ (prolongation notification 10.06.2016; similar reasons
for prolongation notifications 11.11.2016, 13.2.2017 and 17.5.2017)
 ‘During and on the days before the upcoming UCI Road World Championships
in Bergen from the 16th until the 24th of September […]. Events like the
aforementioned Championships are known to attract spectators with
alternative motivations, hereunder terrorists. Hosting the World Championships
in itself poses a serious threat to internal security, and calls for reintroduction
of border controls at the relevant internal air border.’ (notification 25.8.2017)
 ‘The European Commission announced that it will not be able to present
another proposal on prolonging internal border controls to the Council of the
European Union. The terrorist threat in Europe is a grave concern, and the
European security situation remains tense. […] Shortcomings in the protection
of the external borders and significant irregular secondary migration within the
Schengen area persist. This uncontrolled irregular migration creates serious
threats to public security and order, with a risk of persons suspected of having
terrorist intentions posing as refugees.’ (notification 13.10.2017)
Scope
‘The border control may extend to all internal borders, i.e. air, sea and land borders,
whereby the specific border section and border crossing point are determined by
the National Police Directorate. The reintroduced border control will initially focus
on ports with ferry connections to Norway via internal borders’ (notification
25.11.2015).
In subsequent notifications scope remains unclear as it is mentioned that ‘controls
remain limited’ and also ‘based on a risk assessment’ and ‘with minimal impact on
regular travelers’ though it is also suggested that ‘the border control may, however
extend to all internal borders, i.e. air, sea, land borders, if necessary.’ In
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with Article 26 of Regulation (EU)
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 8827/16, 12.05.2016.
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with Article 29(2) of Regulation
(EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document, 10135/16, 10.06.2016.
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with Article 29(2) of Regulation
(EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 14386/16, 11.11.2016.
 Norwegian delegation (2017), Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with Article 29(2) of Regulation
(EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 6257/17, 13.2.2017.
 Norwegian delegation (2017), Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with the Council Implementing
Decision (EU) 2017/818. Brussels, Council
document 9382/17, 17.5.2017
 Norwegian delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the
Norwegian air border in accordance with Article
25 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union
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12.02.2016 notification mentioned that there have been no negative reactions from
the public.’
‘[…] at the Norwegian ports with ferry connections to Sweden, Denmark and
Germany’ (prolongation notifications 10.6.2016, 11.11.2016, 13.2.2017,
17.5.2017)
‘[…] at Bergen airport’ (notification 25.8.2017)
‘[…] at the Norwegian ports with ferry connections to Denmark, Germany and
Sweden […]. Additional internal border controls at air- and land borders are subject
to ongoing assessment of the threats to the internal security.’ (prolongation
notification 13.10.2017)
Code on the rules of the governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 11734/17, 25.8.2017
 Norwegian delegation (2017), Prolongation of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in
accordance with Articles 25 and 27 of
Regulation 2016/399 on a Union Code on the
rules governing the movement of persons
across borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 13205/17,
13.10.2017.
POLAND
04.07.2016-
02.08.2016
<30 days
Legal basis
Article 25 & 27 SBC
Reasons
 ‘In connection with the necessity to ensure internal security and public order
during the Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (8-9 July 2016),
World Youth Days (25-31 July 2016) and the pilgrimage of the Holy Father to
Poland (28-31 July 2016) […].’
Scope
 ‘[…] at the state border sections with the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and the Republic of Lithuania as well as
at sea and air border crossing points.’
 Polish delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the Polish
internal borders in accordance with Article 27
of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code
on the rules governing the movement of
persons across borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, Council document 9991/16,
8.6.2016.
PORTUGAL
10.05.2017-
14.05.2017
<10 days
Legal basis
Article 25 & 26 SBC
Reasons
 Portuguese delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the
Portuguese internal borders in accordance with
Articles 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU)
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
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 ‘In connection with the necessity to ensure internal security and public order
during the pilgrimage of the Holy Father to Fatima-Portugal (12 and 13 May
2017 […]’.
Scope
 Scope of temporary internal border controls is not specified in detail,
Portuguese delegation’s notification refers to ‘the border controls [that] may
extend to all internal border, including land sea and air borders, and its scope
and intensity will remain limited to what is strictly necessary to respond to the
threat to public order and internal security. During this period, crossing of the
internal land border of Portugal will be allowing in the following authorized
crossing points: […]’.
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 7967/17, 3.4.2017.
SLOVENIA
17.9.2015-
26.9.2015
27.9.2015-
16.10.2015
<30 days
Legal basis
Article 25 SBC 2006 (notification 17.09.2015, prolongations - 25.09.2015,
20.10.2015)
Reasons
 ‘The current situation involving uncontrollable migration flows in the region,
coupled with the measures recently adopted by the neighbouring countries,
including reinstated border controls at the internal borders, presents a serious
threat to Slovenia’s national security […] The extent and intensity of border
controls will therefore depend on the security situation and particularly the
number of migrants coming from Hungary […] Slovenia sincerely hopes that all
Member States, especially those at the external borders, will ensure
appropriate level of border control in line with the Schengen standards and
introduce adequate migration procedures to avoid having to apply this
extraordinary measure at the internal borders’ (notification 17.9.2015)
 ‘Since the introduction of this measure [17.9.2015 reintroduction of border
controls] the situation in the area of illegal migration has not changed
significantly, nor have countries in the region introduced measures which would
indicate that the situation would change’ (prolongation notice 25.9.2015)
 ‘We have again carefully assessed the situation, taking into account all the
relevant indicators, and it has been established that to continue with this
extraordinary measure would no longer be necessary and justified’ (termination
notification 20.10.2015)
 Slovenian delegation (2015) Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the
Slovenian internal borders in accordance with
Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document, 12111/15,
17.09.2015.
 Slovenian delegation (2015) Prolongation of
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Slovenian internal borders in accordance
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document, Council
document, 12418/15, 25.09.2015.
 Slovenian delegation (2015) Termination of
the temporary reintroduction of border
controls at the Slovenian internal borders in
accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders
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Scope
‘Land internal border with the Republic of Hungary’
Reporting
‘We have always taken into account the situation in our neighbourhood and in the
region, especially measures taken by Austria and Hungary, but also other Member
States, which could according to our assessments, have significant impact on the
migration route and consequently on the increased pressure on this part of the
Slovenian border. In addition, the existing trends, available data and risk analysis
have been considered when adopting our measures. It was especially on this basis
that we decided for the prolongation of the temporary internal border control after
the initial 10 days […] we have assessed with great care the necessity and
proportionality of such measure, bearing in mind at all times that the reintroduction
of internal border controls is only a temporary measure of last resort […]’
‘According to the available statistical data there was an overall increase of the illegal
crossings at the internal borders during the first eight months of 2015 (compared
to the same period of the previous year). The biggest increase (more than 300%)
was in fact noted at the Slovenian-Hungarian land border. Already prior to the
reintroduction of border controls numerous cases of illegal border crossings (mostly
by citizens of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh) from Hungary towards Italy
were identified. These experiences and the fact that almost simultaneously, on 16
September 2015, Austria also reintroduced border controls at the Hungarian border
led us to the reasonable conclusion that a significant part of migration flow could
be diverted towards Slovenia. Taking all these circumstances into account it was
assessed that only compensatory measures would not be enough to efficiently
control the migration flow’
Results: 5.852 checks of vehicles and 18.706 persons were checked, 35 persons
were refused entry to Slovenia, in most cases because they were not in
possession of a valid travel document, visa or residence permit. 138 hits in SIS and
5 hits in Interpol databases, 218 ‘repressive measures’ issued, 13 cases of
document fraud identified, 3 persons applied for international protection
‘Although initially foreseen to be carried out at different most important
communications for the cross-border traffic at this section of the border, the border
control was later in fact carried out only at one of them. The control of vehicles and
persons was carried out on a selective basis in accordance with the risk analysis.
The railway communications were not part of the control’
(Report 18.10.2015)
Code). Brussels, Council document, 13170/15,
20.10.2015.
 Slovenian delegation (2015) Report on the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Slovenian internal borders in accordance
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document, 14212/15,
18.10.2015.
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SWEDEN
12.11.2015-
09.01.2016
<60 days
10.01.2016-
08.04.2016
<90 days
09.04.2016-
08.05.2016
30 days
09.05.2016-
07.06.2016
30 days
08.06.2016-
11.11.2016
180 days
12.11.2016-
11.02.2017
90 days
12.02.2017-
11.05.2017
90 days
07.04.2017-
14.04.2017
<10 days
12.05.2017-
11.11.2017
Legal basis
Articles 23 & 25 SBC 2006 (notification 12.11.2015, prolongation 20.11.2015,
11.12.2015, 18.12.2015, 07.01.2016)
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006 (prolongation 08.02.2016, 08.03.2016, 08.04.2016)
Articles 25 & 27 SBC 2006 (prolongation notification 04.05.2016)
Article 29(2) SBC (prolongation notifications 06.06.2016, 21.11.2016, 15.2.2017)
Article 28 SBC (notifications 19.4.2017, 15.11.2017)
Council Implementing Decision 2017/818 (prolongation notification 17.5.2017)
Article 25 SBC (prolongation notification 13.10.2017)
Reasons
 ‘Sweden is currently facing an unprecedented migratory flow. The flows are
mixed and may include i.a. asylum seekers, economic migrants, potential
criminals such as smugglers or traffickers of human beings, but also potential
victims of crime. People now arriving in Sweden, not seeking to legalise their
stay, constitute easy targets for perpetrators ready to abuse their vulnerable
situation  […] The fact that the migratory flow are mixed creates great
difficulties, whereby a reintroduction of border control at internal borders by
way of identifying the different categories of persons, would facilitate the
agency’s [Swedish Migration Agency] work […] The Swedish Civil Contingencies
Agency […] reported that the migratory flows now lead to extreme and
increasing challenges regarding the functionality of the Swedish society, which
is one of the three goals of Swedish security. The agency points to severe
strains on mainly housing, health care, schooling and social services, but also
other areas vital to the functioning of the society […] As a consequence there
is a need to already at the border, before the migrants disappear into the
country or go into hiding, be able to distinguish between the different
categories of people. The border control will help directing the different
categories of persons to the correct services, be it the Swedish Migration
Agency, the Swedish Police Authority, the social services or some other relevant
 Swedish delegation (2015) Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the
Swedish internal borders in accordance with
Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006
establishing a Community Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 14047/15,
12.11.2015.
 Swedish delegation (2015) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, Council document 14383/15,
20.11.2015.
 Swedish delegation (2015) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, Council document 15253/15,
11.12.2015.
 Swedish delegation (2015) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, Council document 15456/15,
18.12.2015.
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180 days
12.11.2017-
11.05.2018
180 days
12.11.2017-
19.11.2017
<10 days
service. It will also enable the prevention and detection of serious crime […]
the possibility for immediately distinguishing between the various categories
and identifying the persons will contribute to different services’ capacity to
manage the people falling under their responsibility. In that way, border control
will contribute to the functionality of the Swedish society and thereby to the
goals of Swedish security’ (notification 12.11.2015)
 ‘In its most recent situational picture, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
states that the challenges for a range of important services in Swedish society
are likely to increase and the situation is likely to deter[iorate]’ (prolongation
notification 20.11.2015, reiterated in prolongation notification 11.12.2015)
 ‘The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency states that the challenges for a range
of important services in Swedish society are great and the strained situation is
likely to remain so for some time. The influx of asylum applicants in Sweden
has decreased, but still remains very high, especially for this time of year’
(prolongation notification 18.12.2015)
 ‘The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency states that the challenges for a range
of important services in Swedish society are great and the strained situation is
likely to remain so for some time. The influx of asylum applicants in Sweden
has decreased, but still remains very high, especially for this time of year’
(prolongation notification 07.01.2016, same as 18.11.2015)
 ‘Although the number of new asylum seekers has decreased, the effects from
the unprecedented migratory pressure in the latter part of 2015 combined with
the current influx, still makes the situation very challenging for many of the
important services in Sweden’ (prolongation notification 08.02.2016,
08.03.2016, 08.04.2016, 04.05.2016)
 ‘On 12 May 2016, the Council of the European Union, based on the proposal of
the European Commission, adopted a Council Implementing Decision setting
out a Recommendation for temporary internal border control in exceptional
circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk. The
Implementing Decision recommends Sweden to maintain proportionate
temporary border control for a maximum period of six months’ (prolongation
notification 06.06.2016; similar reasons for prolongation notifications
21.11.2016, 15.2.2017, 17.5.2017)
 ‘Due to the suspected terror attack in Stockholm on 7 April 2017, the Swedish
Policy Authority the same day decided to reintroduce border controls at the
Swedish internal borders. […] Following the development of events, the
Swedish Policy Authority has informed the Swedish Government that as of 15
April 2017 there will no longer be a need for border controls at the internal
borders.’ (notification 19.4.2017)
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, Council document 5103/16,
07.01.2016.
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, Council document 5914/16,
08.02.2016.
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, Council document 6886/16,
08.03.2016.
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC)
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders
Code). Brussels, Council document 7716/16,
08.04.2016.
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 26 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on
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 ‘[…] due to the continuous serious threat to public policy and internal security,
the Swedish government intends to take a decision on the temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the Swedish internal borders. […] The
European Commission has announced that it will not be able to present another
proposal on prolonging internal border controls once the current
Recommendation expires in November. However, the serious threat to public
policy and internal security remains. The Swedish Security Service has come
to the conclusion that the threat level remains the same as on 7 April 2017
when Stockholm witnessed what is considered a terrorist attack. Shortcomings
in the protection of the external borders persist and contribute to this threat,
as they enable potential terrorists and other criminals to enter the Schengen
territory unnoticed.’ (notification 13.10.2017)
 ‘On Friday 10 November 2017 the Swedish Policy Authority decided to
reintroduce border controls at the Swedish internal borders. […] The reason for
the Police Authority’s decision is the risk of unrest and serious disorder in
connection to the Social Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth. On 17 November
the summit will gather heads of state and government as well as over 30
organisations and actors.’ (notification 15.11.2017)
Scope
‘The border control may extend to all internal borders, including land-, sea- and air
borders, whereby the specific border sections and border crossing points are
determined by the Swedish Police Authority. […] the control will initially focus on
selected harbours in Police Region South and Police Region West as well as on the
Öresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden’. (all Swedish notifications except
for notifications 19.4.2017, 13.10.2017, and 15.11.2017)
Scope of internal border controls are not specified in the notifications of 19.4.2017
and 13.10.2017
‘Border checks will be carried out […] at Gothenburg Landvetter Airport and at
Svinesund on the border between Sweden and Norway.’ (notification 15.11.2017)
a Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across Schengen
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels,
Council document 8827/16, 12.05.2016.
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Articles 25 and 27 of Regulation (EU)
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules
governing the movement of persons across
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code).
Brussels, Council document 8667/16,
04.05.2016.
 Swedish delegation (2016), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399
on a Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 9865/16, 06.06.2016.
 Swedish delegation (2016), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399
on a Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 14680/16, 21.11.2016.
 Swedish delegation (2017), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399
on a Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 6258/17, 15.2.2017.
 Swedish delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the
Swedish internal borders in accordance with
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Article 28 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 8319/17, 19.4.2017.
 Swedish delegation (2017), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with the Council Implementing Decision (EU)
2017/818. Brussels, Council document
9379/17, 17.5.2017.
 Swedish delegation (2017), Prolongation of the
temporary reintroduction of border controls at
the Swedish internal borders in accordance
with Article 25 of Regulation 2016/399 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 13203/17, 13.10.2017.
 Swedish delegation (2017), Temporary
reintroduction of border controls at the
Swedish internal borders in accordance with
Article 28(1) of Regulation 2016/399 on a
Union Code on the rules governing the
movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council
document 14407/17, 15.11.2017.
Abstract
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developments that have occurred in the Schengen Governance Framework since
2016. It analyses the legitimacy of a number of States’ decisions to maintain internal
border controls. Also, most recent policy proposals in the field of internal police
checks are assessed in light of relevant EU legal standards. The paper also questions
the legality of the border walls and fences, which have been recently erected at the
EU external borders and within the Schengen area.
DISCLAIMER
This document is addressed to the Members and staff of the European Parliament to assist them in their
parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and should
not be taken to represent an official position of the European Parliament.
Print ISBN 978-92-846-2656-4| doi: 10.2861/036764| QA-01-18-148-EN-C
PDF ISBN 978-92-846-2657-1| doi: 10.2861/839064| QA-01-18-148-EN-N
